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The scientific understanding of climate change and the impact it 
has on different levels of decision-making and policy options has 
increased since the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). In addi-
tion, there is a growing recognition that decision makers often rely 
on intuitive thinking processes rather than undertaking a systematic 
analysis of options in a deliberative fashion. It is appropriate that 
climate change risk management strategies take into account both 
forms of thinking when considering policy choices where there is risk 
and uncertainty. 
Consideration of risk perception and decision processes can 
improve risk communication, leading to more effective poli-
cies for dealing with climate change� By understanding the sys-
tematic biases that individuals utilize in dealing with climate change 
problems, one can more effectively communicate the nature of the 
climate change risk. An understanding of the simplified decision 
rules employed by decision makers in making choices may be helpful 
in designing policies that encourage the adoption of mitigation and 
adaptation measures. [Section 2.4]
Decision processes often include both deliberative and intuitive 
thinking� When making mitigation and adaptation choices, decision 
makers sometimes calculate the costs and benefits of their alterna-
tives (deliberative thinking). They are also likely to utilize emotion- and 
rule-based responses that are conditioned by personal past experience, 
social context, and cultural factors (intuitive thinking). [2.4.2]
Laypersons tend to judge risks differently than experts� Layper-
sons’ perceptions of climate change risks and uncertainties are often 
influenced by past experience, as well as by emotional processes that 
characterize intuitive thinking. This may lead them to overestimate or 
underestimate the risk. Experts engage in more deliberative thinking 
than laypersons by utilizing scientific data to estimate the likelihood 
and consequences of climate change. [2.4.6]
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) can enable decision makers to examine costs and ben-
efits, but these methodologies also have their limitations� Both 
approaches highlight the importance of considering the likelihood of 
events over time and the importance of focusing on long-term hori-
zons when evaluating climate change mitigation and adaptation poli-
cies. CBA enables governments and other collective decision-making 
units to compare the social costs and benefits of different alternatives. 
However, CBA cannot deal well with infinite (negative) expected utili-
ties arising from low probability catastrophic events often referred to 
as ‘fat tails’. CEA can generate cost estimates for stabilizing green-
house gas (GHG) concentrations without having to take into account 
the uncertainties associated with cost estimates for climate change 
impacts. A limitation of CEA is that it takes the long-term stabilization 
as a given without considering the economic efficiency of the target 
level. [2.5.3, 2.5.4]
Formalized expert judgment and elicitation processes improve 
the characterization of uncertainty for designing climate 
change strategies (high confidence). Experts can quantify uncer-
tainty through formal elicitation processes. Their judgments can char-
acterize the uncertainties associated with a risk but not reduce them. 
The expert judgment process highlights the importance of undertaking 
more detailed analyses to design prudent climate policies. [2.5.6]
Individuals and organizations that link science with policy grap-
ple with several different forms of uncertainty� These uncertain-
ties include absence of prior agreement on framing of problems and 
ways to scientifically investigate them (paradigmatic uncertainty), lack 
of information or knowledge for characterizing phenomena (epistemic 
uncertainty), and incomplete or conflicting scientific findings (transla-
tional uncertainty). [2.6.2]
The social benefit from investments in mitigation tends to 
increase when uncertainty in the factors relating GHG emissions 
to climate change impacts are considered (medium confidence). 
If one sets a global mean temperature (GMT) target, then normative 
analyses that include uncertainty on the climate response to elevated 
GHG concentration, suggest that investments in mitigation measures 
should be accelerated. Under the assumption of nonlinear impacts of 
a GMT rise, inclusion of uncertainty along the causal chain from emis-
sions to impacts suggests enhancing mitigation. [2.6.3]
The desirability of climate policies and instruments are affected 
by decision makers’ responses to key uncertainties� At the 
national level, uncertainties in market behaviour and future regulatory 
actions have been shown to impact the performance of policy instru-
ments designed to influence investment patterns. Both modelling and 
empirical studies have shown that uncertainty as to future regulatory 
and market conditions adversely affects the performance of emission 
allowance trading markets [2.6.5.1]. Other studies have shown that 
subsidy programmes (e. g., feed-in tariffs, tax credits) are relatively 
immune to market uncertainties, but that uncertainties with respect to 
the duration and level of the subsidy program can have adverse effects 
[2.6.5.2]. In both cases, the adverse effects of uncertainty include less 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure, increasing consumer prices, 
and reducing the pressure for technological development.
Decision makers in developing countries often face a particu-
lar set of challenges associated with implementing mitigation 
policies under risk and uncertainty (medium confidence). Manag-
ing risk and uncertainty in the context of climate policy is of particular 
importance to developing countries that are resource constrained and 
face other pressing development goals. In addition, institutional capac-
ity in these countries may be less developed compared to advanced 
economies. Therefore, decision makers in these countries (governments 
and economic agents such as firms, farmers, households, to name a 
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few) have less room for ‘error’ (uncertain outcomes and / or wrong or 
poorly implemented policies). The same applies to national, regional 
and local governments in developed countries who can ill afford to 
waste scarce resources through policy errors. [Box 2.1]
2.1 Introduction
This framing chapter considers ways in which risk and uncertainty can 
affect the process and outcome of strategic choices in responding to 
the threat of climate change. 
‘Uncertainty’ denotes a cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
results from a lack of information and / or from disagreement about 
what is known or even knowable. It has many sources ranging from 
quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or ter-
minology to uncertain projections of human behaviour. The Guidance 
Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consis-
tent Treatment of Uncertainties (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) summarizes 
alternative ways of representing uncertainty. Probability density func-
tions and parameter intervals are among the most common tools for 
characterizing uncertainty.
‘Risk’ refers to the potential for adverse effects on lives, livelihoods, 
health status, economic, social and cultural assets, services (includ-
ing environmental), and infrastructure due to uncertain states of the 
world. To the extent that there is a detailed understanding of the char-
acteristics of a specific event, experts will normally be in agreement 
regarding estimates of the likelihood of its occurrence and its resulting 
consequences. Risk can also be subjective in the sense that the likeli-
hood and outcomes are based on the knowledge or perception that a 
person has about a given situation. There may also be risks associated 
with the outcomes of different climate policies, such as the harm aris-
ing from a change in regulations.
There is a growing recognition that today’s policy choices are highly 
sensitive to uncertainties and risk associated with the climate system 
and the actions of other decision makers. The choice of climate policies 
can thus be viewed as an exercise in risk management (Kunreuther 
et al., 2013a). Figure 2.1 suggests a risk management framework that 
serves as the structure of the chapter.
After defining risk and uncertainty and their relevant metrics (Section 
2.2), we consider how choices with respect to climate change policy 
options are sensitive to risk and uncertainty (Section 2.3). A taxon-
omy depicts the levels of decision making ranging from international 
agreements to actions undertaken by individuals in relation to climate 
change policy options under conditions of risk and uncertainty that 
range from long-term global temperature targets to lifestyle choices. 
The goals and values of the different stakeholders given their immedi-
ate and long-term agendas will also influence the relative attractive-
ness of different climate change policies in the face of risk and uncer-
tainty.
Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 characterize descriptive and normative 
theories of decision-making and models of choice for dealing with 
risk and uncertainty and their implications for prescriptive analysis. 
Descriptive refers to theories of actual behaviour, based on experi-
mental evidence and field studies that characterize the perception 
of risk and decision processes. Normative in the context of this chap-
ter refers to theories of choice under risk and uncertainty based on 
abstract models and axioms that serve as benchmarks as to how 
decision makers should ideally make their choices. Prescriptive refers 
to ways of improving the decision process and making final choices 
(Kleindorfer et al., 1993).
A large empirical literature has revealed that individuals, small groups 
and organizations often do not make decisions in the analytic or ratio-
nal way envisioned by normative models of choice in the economics 
and management science literature. People frequently perceive risk 
in ways that differ from expert judgments, posing challenges for risk 
communication and response. There is a tendency to focus on short 
time horizons, utilize simple heuristics in choosing between alterna-
tives, and selectively attend to subsets of goals and objectives.
To illustrate, the voting public in some countries may have a wait-
and-see attitude toward climate change, leading their governments to 
postpone mitigation measures designed to meet specified climate tar-
gets (Sterman, 2008; Dutt and Gonzalez, 2011). A coastal village may 
decide not to undertake measures for reducing future flood risks due 
to sea level rise (SLR), because their perceived likelihood that SLR will 
cause problems to their village is below the community council’s level 
of concern. 
Section 2.4 provides empirical evidence on behavioural responses to 
risk and uncertainty by examining the types of biases that influence 
individuals’ perception of the likelihood of an event (e. g., availability, 
learning from personal experience), the role that emotional, social, and 
cultural factors play in influencing the perception of climate change 
risks and strategies for encouraging decision makers to undertake 
cost-effective measures to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of cli-
mate change.
A wide range of decision tools have been developed for evaluating 
alternative options and making choices in a systematic manner even 
when probabilities are difficult to characterize and / or outcomes are 
uncertain. The relevance of these tools for making more informed 
decisions depends on how the problem is formulated and framed, the 
nature of the institutional arrangements, and the interactions between 
stakeholders (Hammond et al., 1999; Schoemaker and Russo, 2001).
Governments debating the merits of a carbon tax may turn to cost-
benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis to justify their positions. 
They may need to take into account that firms who utilize formal 
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approaches, such as decision analysis, may not reduce their emissions 
if they feel that they are unlikely to be penalized because the carbon 
tax will not be well enforced. Households and individuals may find the 
expected utility model or decision analysis to be useful tools for evalu-
ating the costs and benefits of adopting energy efficient measures 
given the trajectory of future energy prices.
Section 2.5 delineates formal methodologies and decision aids for ana-
lysing risk and uncertainty when individuals, households, firms, com-
munities and nations are making choices that impact their own well-
being and those of others. These tools encompass variants of expected 
utility theory, decision analysis, cost-benefit analyses or cost-effective-
ness analyses that are implemented in integrated assessment models 
(IAMs). Decision aids include adaptive management, robust decision 
making and uncertainty analysis techniques such as structured expert 
judgment and scenario analysis. The chapter highlights the importance 
of selecting different methodologies for addressing different problems.
Developing robust policy response strategies and instruments should 
take into account how the relevant stakeholders perceive risk and their 
behavioural responses to uncertain information and data (descriptive 
analysis). The policy design process also needs to consider the meth-
odologies and decision aids for systematically addressing issues of 
risk and uncertainty (normative analysis) that suggest strategies for 
improving outcomes at the individual and societal level (prescriptive 
analysis).
Section 2.6 examines how the outcomes of particular options, in terms 
of their efficiency or equity, are sensitive to risks and uncertainties and 
affect policy choices. After examining the role of uncertainty in the sci-
ence / policy interface, it examines the role of integrated assessment 
models (IAMs) from the perspective of the social planner operating 
at a global level and the structuring of international negotiations and 
paths to reach agreement. Integrated assessment models combined 
with an understanding of the negotiation process for reaching inter-
national agreements may prove useful to delegates for justifying the 
positions of their country at a global climate conference. The section 
also examines the role that uncertainty plays in the performance of dif-
ferent technologies now and in the future as well as how lifestyle deci-
sions such as investing in energy efficient measures can be improved. 
Figure 2�1 | A risk management framework. Numbers in brackets refer to sections where more information on these topics can be found.




Risk Perception and Responses 
to Risk and Uncertainty 
(Descriptive Analysis)              
[Section 2.4]
Tools and Decisions Aids for 
Analysing Uncertainty and Risk
(Normative Analysis)           
[Section 2.5]
Impact of Risk and Uncertainty on 
Climate Change Policy Choices 
[Sections 2.2 and 2.3] 
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The section concludes by examining the roles that risk and uncertainty 
play in support of or opposition to climate policies.
The way climate change is managed will have an impact on policy 
choices as shown by the feedback loop in Figure 2.1, suggesting that 
the risk management process for addressing climate change is itera-
tive. The nature of this feedback can be illustrated by the following 
examples. Individuals may be willing to invest in solar panels if they 
are able to spread the upfront cost over time through a long-term 
loan. Firms may be willing to promote new energy technologies that 
provide social benefits with respect to climate change if they are 
given a grant to assist them in their efforts. National governments 
are more likely to implement carbon markets or international trea-
ties if they perceive the short-term benefits of these measures to be 
greater than the perceived costs. Education and learning can play key 
roles in how climate change is managed through a reconsideration 
of policies for managing the risks and uncertainties associated with 
climate change.
2.2 Metrics of  uncertainty 
and risk
The IPCC strives for a treatment of risk and uncertainty that is consis-
tent across all three Working Groups based the Guidance Note (GN) 
for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent 
Treatment of Uncertainties (Mastrandrea et  al., 2010). This section 
summarizes key aspects of the GN that frames the discussion in this 
chapter.
The GN indicates that author teams should evaluate the associated 
evidence and agreement with respect to specific findings that involve 
risk and uncertainty. The amount of evidence available can range from 
small to large, and can vary in quality and consistency. The GN recom-
mends reporting the degree of certainty and / or uncertainty of a given 
topic as a measure of the consensus or agreement across the scien-
tific community. Confidence expresses the extent to which the IPCC 
authors do in fact support a key finding. If confidence is sufficiently 
high, the GN suggests specifying the key finding in terms of probabil-
ity. The evaluation of evidence and degree of agreement of any key 
finding is labelled a traceable account in the GN.
The GN also recommends taking a risk-management perspective by 
stating that “sound decision making that anticipates, prepares for, 
and responds to climate change depends on information about the 
full range of possible consequences and associated probabilities.” 
The GN also notes that, “low-probability outcomes can have signifi-
cant impacts, particularly when characterized by large magnitude, long 
persistence, broad prevalence, and / or irreversibility.” For this reason, 
the GN encourages the presentation of information on the extremes 
of the probability distributions of key variables, reporting quantitative 
estimates when possible and supplying qualitative assessments and 
evaluations when appropriate.
2.3 Risk and uncertainty 
in climate change
Since the publication of AR4, political scientists have documented the 
many choices of climate policy and the range of interested parties con-
cerned with them (Moser, 2007; Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley, 2010; 
Betsill and Hoffmann, 2011; Cabré, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011; Meckling, 
2011; Victor, 2011).
There continues to be a concern about global targets for mean surface 
temperature and GHG concentrations that are discussed in Chapter 6 
of this report. This choice is normally made at the global level with 
some regions, countries, and sub-national political regions setting their 
own targets consistent with what they believe the global ones should 
be. Policymakers at all levels of decision making face a second-order 
set of choices as to how to achieve the desired targets. Choices in this 
vein that are assessed in Chapters 7 – 12 of this report, include tran-
sition pathways for various drivers of emissions, such as fossil fuels 
within the energy system, energy efficiency and energy-intensive 
behavioural patterns, issues associated with land-use and spatial plan-
ning, and / or the emissions of non- CO2 greenhouse gases.
The drivers influencing climate change policy options are discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 13 – 16 of this report. These options include 
information provision, economic instruments (taxes, subsidies, fines), 
direct regulations and standards, and public investments. At the same 
time, individuals, groups and firms decide what actions to take on their 
own. These choices, some of which may be in response to governmen-
tal policy, include investments, lifestyle and behaviour.
Decisions for mitigating climate change are complemented by climate 
adaptation options and reflect existing environmental trends and driv-
ers. The policy options are likely to be evaluated with a set of crite-
ria that include economic impacts and costs, equity and distributional 
considerations, sustainable development, risks to individuals and soci-
ety and co-benefits. Many of these issues are discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4.
2�3�1 Uncertainties that matter for climate 
policy choices
The range and number of interested parties who are involved in cli-
mate policy choices have increased significantly in recent years. There 
has been a widening of the governance forums within which climate 
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policies and international agreements are negotiated at the global 
level (Victor, 2011), across multiple networks within national gov-
ernments (Andonova et al., 2009; Hoffmann, 2011), and at the local, 
regional and / or interest group level (Moser, 2007; Bulkeley, 2010). At 
the same time, the number of different policy instruments under active 
discussion has increased, from an initial focus on cap-and-trade and 
carbon tax instruments (Betsill and Hoffmann, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011), 
to feed-in tariffs or quotas for renewable energy (Wiser et al., 2005; 
Mendonça, 2007), investments in research and development (Sagar 
and van der Zwaan, 2006; De Coninck et al., 2008; Grubler and Riahi, 
2010), and reform of intellectual property laws (Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2011; Percival and Miller, 2011).
Choices are sensitive to the degree of uncertainty with respect to a 
set of parameters that are often of specific importance to particular 
climate policy decisions. Here, and as shown in Figure 2.2, we group 
these uncertainties into five broad classes, consistent with the 
approach taken in Patt and Weber (2014):
•	 Climate responses to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and their 
associated impacts. The large number of key uncertainties with 
respect to the climate system are discussed in Working Group  I 
(WGI). There are even greater uncertainties with respect to the 
impacts of changes in the climate system on humans and the eco-
logical system as well as their costs to society. These impacts are 
assessed in WGII.
•	 Stocks and flows of carbon and other GHGs. The large uncertain-
ties with respect to both historical and current GHG sources and 
sinks from energy use, industry, and land-use changes are assessed 
in Chapter 5. Knowledge gaps make it especially difficult to esti-
mate how the flows of greenhouse gases will evolve in the future 
under conditions of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations and 
their impact on climatic and ecological processes.
•	 Technological systems. The deployment of technologies is likely to 
be the main driver of GHG emissions and a major driver of climate 
vulnerability. Future deployment of new technologies will depend 
on how their price, availability, and reliability evolve over time as a 
result of technological learning. There are uncertainties as to how 
fast the learning will take place, what policies can accelerate learn-
ing and the effects of accelerated learning on deployment rates of 
new technologies. Technological deployment also depends on the 
degree of public acceptance, which in turn is typically sensitive to 
perceptions of health and safety risks.
•	 Market behaviour and regulatory actions. Public policies can create 
incentives for private sector actors to alter their investment behav-
iour, often in the presence of other overlapping regulations. The 
extent to which firms change their behaviour in response to the 
policy, however, often depends on their expectations about other 
highly uncertain market factors, such as fossil fuel prices. There are 
also uncertainties concerning the macro-economic effects of the 
aggregated behavioural changes. An additional factor influencing 
the importance of any proposed or existing policy-driven incen-
tive is the likelihood with which regulations will be enacted and 
enforced over the lifetime of firms’ investment cycles. 
•	 Individual and firm perceptions. The choices undertaken by key 
decision makers with respect to mitigation and adaptation mea-
sures are impacted by their perceptions of risk and uncertainties, 
as well as their perceptions of the relevant costs and expected 
benefits over time. Their decisions may also be influenced by the 
actions undertaken by others.
Section 2.6 assesses the effects of uncertainties of these different 
parameters on a wide range of policy choices, drawing from both 
empirical studies and the modelling literature. The following three 
examples illustrate how uncertainties in one or more of the above fac-
tors can influence choices between alternative options.
Example 1: Designing a regional emissions trading system (ETS). Over 
the past decade, a number of political jurisdictions have designed and 
implemented ETSs, with the European ETS being the one most stud-
ied. In designing the European system, policymakers took as their 
starting point pre-defined emissions reduction targets. It was unclear 
whether these targets would be met, due to uncertainties with respect 
to national baseline emissions. The stocks and flows of greenhouse 
gas emissions were partly determined by the uncertainty of the perfor-
mance of the technological systems that were deployed. Uncertainties 
in market behaviour could also influence target prices and the number 
of emissions permits allocated to different countries (Betsill and Hoff-
mann, 2011).
Example 2: Supporting scientific research into solar radiation manage-
ment (SRM). SRM may help avert potentially catastrophic temperature 
increases, but may have other negative impacts with respect to global 
and regional climatic conditions (Rasch et al., 2008). Research could 
reduce the uncertainties as to these other consequences (Robock et al., 
2010). The decision to invest in specific research activities requires an 
assessment as to what impact SRM will have on avoiding catastrophic 
temperature increases. Temperature change will be sensitive to the 
stocks and flows of greenhouse gases (GHG) and therefore to the 
responses by key decision makers to the impacts of GHG emissions. The 
decision to invest in specific research activities is likely to be influenced 
by the perceived uncertainty in the actions undertaken by individuals 
and firms (Blackstock and Long, 2010).
Example 3: Renting an apartment in the city versus buying a house 
in the suburbs. When families and households face this choice, it is 
likely to be driven by factors other than climate change concerns. The 
decision, however, can have major consequences on CO2 emissions as 
well as on the impacts of climate change on future disasters such as 
damage from flooding due to sea level rise. Hence, governments may 
seek to influence these decisions as part of their portfolio of climate 
change policies through measures such as land-use regulations or the 
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pricing of local transportation options. The final choice is thus likely to 
be sensitive to uncertainties in market behaviour as well as actions 
undertaken by individuals and firms.
To add structure and clarity to the many uncertainties that different 
actors face for different types of problems, we introduce a taxonomy 
shown in Figure 2.2 that focuses on levels of decision making (the 
rows) that range from international organizations to individuals and 
households, and climate policy options (the columns) that include 
long-term targets, transition pathways, policy instruments, resource 
allocation and lifestyle options. The circles that overlay the cells in Fig-
ure 2.2 highlight the principal uncertainties relevant to decision-mak-
ing levels and climate policy choices that appear prominently in the 
literature associated with particular policies. These are reviewed in 
Section 2.6 of this chapter and in many of the following chapters of 
WGIII. The literature appraises the effects of a wide range of uncertain-
ties, which we group according to the five types described above.
2�3�2 What is new on risk and uncertainty in 
AR5
Chapter 2 in WGIII AR4 on risk and uncertainty, which also served as a 
framing chapter, illuminated the relationship of risk and uncertainty to 
decision making and reviewed the literature on catastrophic or abrupt 
climate change and its irreversible nature. It examined three pillars for 
dealing with uncertainties: precaution, risk hedging, and crisis preven-
tion and management. The report also summarized the debate in the 
economic literature about the limits of cost-benefit analysis in situa-
tions of uncertainty.
Since the publication of AR4, a growing number of studies have con-
sidered additional sources of risk and uncertainties, such as regulatory 
and technological risks, and examined the role they play in influenc-
ing climate policy. There is also growing awareness that risks in the 
extremes or tail of the distribution make it problematic to rely on his-
torical averages. As the number of political jurisdictions implement-
ing climate policies has increased, there are now empirical findings to 
supplement earlier model-based studies on the effects of such risks. At 
the local level, adaptation studies using scenario-based methods have 
been developed (ECLACS, 2011).
This chapter extends previous reports in four ways. First, rather than 
focusing solely at the global level, this chapter expands climate-related 
decisions to other levels of decision making as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Second, compared to AR4, where judgment and choice were primar-
ily framed in rational-economic terms, this chapter reviews the psy-
chological and behavioural literature on perceptions and responses to 
risk and uncertainty. Third, the chapter considers the pros and cons of 
alternative methodologies and decision aids from the point of view of 
practitioners. Finally, the chapter expands the scope of the challenges 
associated with developing risk management strategies in relation to 
Figure 2�2 | Taxonomy of levels of decision making and climate policy choices. Circles show type and extent of uncertainty sources as they are covered by the literature. Numbers in 
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AR4 that requires reviewing a much larger body of published research. 
To illustrate this point, the chapter references more than 50 publica-
tions on decision making under uncertainty with respect to integrated 
assessment models (IAMs), the first time such a detailed examination 
of this literature has been undertaken.
2.4 Risk perception and 
responses to risk 
and uncertainty
2�4�1 Considerations for design of climate 
change risk reduction policies
When stakeholders are given information about mitigation and adap-
tation measures to reduce climate change risks, they make the fol-
lowing judgments and choices: How serious is the risk? Is any action 
required? Which options are ruled out because the costs seem prohibi-
tive? Which option offers the greatest net expected benefits? 
In designing such measures and in deciding how to present them to 
stakeholders, one needs to recognize both the strengths and limita-
tions of decision makers at the different levels delineated in Figure 2.2. 
Decision makers often have insufficient or imperfect knowledge about 
climate risks, a deficit that can and needs to be addressed by better 
data and public education. However, cognitive and motivational bar-
riers are equally or more important in this regard (Weber and Stern, 
2011).
Normative models of choice described in Section 2.5 indicate how 
decisions under risk and uncertainty should be made to achieve effi-
ciency and consistency, but these approaches do not characterize how 
choices are actually made. Since decision makers have limitations in 
their ability to process information and are boundedly rational (Simon, 
1955), they often use simple heuristics and rules of thumb (Payne et al., 
1988). Their choices are guided not only by external reality (objective 
outcomes and their likelihood) but also by the decision makers’ inter-
nal states (e. g., needs and goals) and their mental representation of 
outcomes and likelihood, often shaped by previous experience. In other 
words, a descriptive model of choice needs to consider cognitive and 
motivational biases and decision rules as well as factors that are con-
sidered when engaging in deliberative thinking. Another complicating 
factor is that when groups or organizations make decisions, there is the 
potential for disagreement and conflict among individuals that may 
require interpersonal and organizational facilitation by a third party.
Mitigation and adaptation decisions are shaped also by existing eco-
nomic and political institutional arrangements. Policy and market tools 
for addressing climate change, such as insurance, may not be feasible 
in developing countries that have no history of this type of protection; 
however, this option may be viewed as desirable in a country with an 
active insurance sector (see Box 2.1). Another important determinant 
of decisions is the status quo, because there is a tendency to give more 
weight to the negative impacts of undertaking change than the equiv-
alent positive impacts (Johnson et al., 2007). For example, proposing 
a carbon tax to reduce GHG emissions may elicit much more concern 
from affected stakeholders as to how this measure will impact on 
their current activities than the expected climate change benefits from 
reducing carbon emissions. Choices are also affected by cultural differ-
ences in values and needs (Maslow, 1954), in beliefs about the exis-
tence and causes of climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2008), and in 
the role of informal social networks for cushioning catastrophic losses 
(Weber and Hsee, 1998). By considering actual judgment and choice 
processes, policymakers can more accurately characterize the effective-
ness and acceptability of alternative mitigation policies and new tech-
nologies. Descriptive models also provide insights into ways of framing 
mitigation or adaptation options so as to increase the likelihood that 
desirable climate policy choices are adopted. Descriptive models, with 
their broader assumptions about goals and processes, also allow for 
the design of behavioural interventions that capitalize on motivations 
such as equity and fairness. 
2�4�2 Intuitive and deliberative judgment and 
choice
The characterization of judgment and choice that distinguishes intui-
tive processes from deliberative processes builds on a large body of 
cognitive psychology and behavioural decision research that can 
be traced to William James (1878) in psychology and to Friedrich 
Nietzsche (2008) and Martin Heidegger (1962) in philosophy. A recent 
summary has been provided by Kahneman (2003; 2011) as detailed in 
Table 2.1:
Table 2�1 | Intuitive and deliberative process characteristics.
Intuitive Thinking (System 1)
Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no voluntary control.
Uses simple and concrete associations, including emotional reactions or simple rules of 
conduct that have been acquired by personal experience with events and their consequences.
Deliberative Thinking (System 2)
Initiates and executes effortful and intentional abstract cognitive 
operations when these are seen as needed.
These cognitive operations include simple or complex computations or formal logic.
Even though the operations of these two types of processes do not 
map cleanly onto distinct brain regions, and the two systems often 
operate cooperatively and in parallel (Weber and Johnson, 2009), the 
distinction between Systems 1 and 2 helps to clarify the tension in the 
human mind between the automatic and largely involuntary processes 
of intuitive decisions, versus the effortful and more deliberate pro-
cesses of analytic decisions (Kahneman, 2011).
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Many of the simplified decision rules that characterize human judg-
ment and choice under uncertainty utilize intuitive (System 1) pro-
cesses. Simplification is achieved by utilizing the experiences, expec-
tations, beliefs, and goals of the interested parties involved in the 
decision. Such shortcuts require much less time and effort than a 
more detailed analysis of the tradeoffs between options and often 
leads to reasonable outcomes. If one takes into account the con-
straints on time and attention and processing capacity of decision 
makers, these decisions may be the best we can do for many choices 
under uncertainty (Simon, 1955). Intuitive processes are utilized not 
only by the general public, but also by technical experts such as insur-
ers and regulators (Kunreuther et al., 2013c) and by groups and orga-
nizations (Cyert and March, 1963; Cohen et  al., 1972; Barreto and 
Patient, 2013).
Intuitive processes work well when decision makers have copious 
data on the outcomes of different decisions and recent experience is 
a meaningful guide for the future, as would be the case in station-
ary environments (Feltovich et al., 2006). These processes do not work 
well, however, for low-probability high-consequence events for which 
the decision maker has limited or no past experience (Weber, 2011). 
In such situations, reliance on intuitive processes for making decisions 
will most likely lead to maintaining the status quo and focusing on the 
recent past. This suggests that intuitive decisions may be problematic 
in dealing with climate change risks such as increased flooding and 
storm surge due to sea level rise, or a surge in fossil fuel prices as 
a result of an unexpected political conflict. These are risks for which 
there is limited or no personal experience or historical data and con-
siderable disagreement and uncertainty among experts with respect to 
their risk assessments (Taleb, 2007).
The formal models and tools that characterize deliberative (System 2) 
thinking require stakeholders to make choices in a more abstract and 
systematic manner. A deliberative process focuses on potential short- 
and long-term consequences and their likelihoods, and evenly evalu-
ates the options under consideration, not favouring the status quo. For 
the low-probability high-consequence situations for which decision 
makers have limited experience with outcomes, alternative decision 
frameworks that do not depend on precise specification of probabili-
ties should be considered in designing risk management strategies for 
climate change (Charlesworth and Okereke, 2010; Kunreuther et  al., 
2013a).
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 2.4.3 
describes some important consequences of the intuitive processes uti-
lized by individuals, groups, and organizations in making decisions. 
The predicted effectiveness of economic or technological climate 
change mitigation solutions typically presuppose rational delibera-
tive thinking and evaluation without considering how perceptions 
and reactions to climate risks impose on these policy options. Sec-
tion 2.4.4 discusses biases and heuristics that suggest that individu-
als learn in ways that differ significantly from deliberative Bayesian 
updating. Section 2.4.5 addresses how behaviour is affected by social 
amplification of risk and considers the different levels of decision 
making in Figure 2.2 by discussing the role of social norms, social 
comparisons, and social networks in the choice process. Section 2.4.6 
characterizes the general public’s perceptions of climate change risks 
and uncertainty and their implications for communicating relevant 
information.
Empirical evidence for the biases associated with climate change 
response decisions triggered by intuitive processes exists mostly at 
the level of the individual. As discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, intui-
tive judgment and choice processes at other levels of decision making, 
such as those specified in Figure 2.2, need to be acknowledged and 
understood. 
2�4�3 Consequences of intuitive decision 
making
The behaviour of individuals are captured by descriptive models of 
choice such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) for 
decisions under risk and uncertainty and the beta-delta model (Laib-
son, 1997) for characterizing how future costs and benefits are evalu-
ated. While individual variation exists, the patterns of responding to 
potential outcomes over time and the probabilities of their occur-
rence have an empirical foundation based on controlled experiments 
and well-designed field studies examining the behaviour of technical 
experts and the general public (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992; Cam-
erer, 2000).
2�4�3�1 Importance of the status quo
The tendency to maintain the current situation is a broadly observed 
phenomenon in climate change response contexts (e. g., inertia in 
switching to a non-carbon economy or in switching to cost-effective 
energy efficient products) (Swim et al., 2011). Sticking with the current 
state of affairs is the easy option, favoured by emotional responses in 
situations of uncertainty (“better the devil you know than the devil 
you don’t”), by many proverbs or rules (“when in doubt, do nothing”), 
and observed biases in the accumulation of arguments for different 
choice options (Weber et al., 2007). Overriding the status quo requires 
commitment to change and effort (Fleming et al., 2010).
Loss aversion and reference points
Loss aversion is an important property that distinguishes prospect the-
ory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) from expected utility theory (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by introducing a reference-depen-
dent valuation of outcomes, with a steeper slope for perceived losses 
than for perceived gains. In other words, people experience more pain 
from a loss than they get pleasure from an equivalent gain. The status 
quo is often the relevant reference point that distinguishes outcomes 
perceived as losses from those perceived as gains. Given loss aversion, 
the potential negative consequences of moving away from the current 
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state of affairs are weighted much more heavily than the potential 
gains, often leading the decision maker not to take action. This behav-
iour is referred to as the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988).
Loss aversion explains a broad range of decisions in controlled labora-
tory experiments and real world choices that deviate from the predic-
tions of rational models like expected utility theory (Camerer, 2000). 
Letson et al. (2009) show that adapting to seasonal and inter-annual 
climate variability in the Argentine Pampas by allocating land to dif-
ferent crops depends not only on existing institutional arrangements 
(e. g., whether the farmer is renting the land or owns it), but also on 
individual differences in farmers’ degree of loss aversion and risk 
aversion. Greene et al. (2009) show that loss aversion combined with 
uncertainty about future cost savings can explain why consumers fre-
quently appear to be unwilling to invest in energy-efficient technology 
such as a more expensive but more fuel-efficient car that has posi-
tive expected utility. Weber and Johnson (2009) distinguish between 
perceptions of risk, attitudes towards risk, and loss aversion that have 
different determinants, but are characterized by a single ‘risk attitude’ 
parameter in expected utility models. Distinguishing and measuring 
these psychologically distinct components of individual differences in 
risk taking (e. g., by using prospect theory and adaptive ways of elicit-
ing its model parameters; Toubia et al., 2013) provides better targeted 
entry points for policy interventions.
Loss aversion influences the choices of experienced decision makers 
in high-stakes risky choice contexts, including professional financial 
markets traders (Haigh and List, 2005) and professional golfers (Pope 
and Schweitzer, 2011). Yet, other contexts fail to elicit loss aversion, 
as evidenced by the failure of much of the global general public to be 
alarmed by the prospect of climate change (Weber, 2006). In this and 
other contexts, loss aversion does not arise because decision makers 
are not emotionally involved (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Use of framing and default options for the design of decision 
aids and interventions
Descriptive models not only help explain behaviours that deviate from 
the predictions of normative models of choice but also provide entry 
points for the design of decision aids and interventions collectively 
referred to as choice architecture, indicating that people’s choices 
depend in part on the ways that possible outcomes of different 
options are framed and presented (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Pros-
pect theory suggests that changing decision makers’ reference points 
can impact on how they evaluate outcomes of different options and 
hence their final choice. Patt and Zeckhauser (2000) show, for exam-
ple, how information about the status quo and other choice options 
can be presented differently to create an action bias with respect to 
addressing the climate change problem. More generally, choice archi-
tecture often involves changing the description of choice options and 
the context of a decision to overcome the pitfalls of intuitive (System 
1) processes without requiring decision makers to switch to effortful 
(System 2) thinking (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
One important choice architecture tool comes in the form of behav-
ioural defaults, that is, recommended options that will be implemented 
if no active decision is made (Johnson and Goldstein, 2013). Default 
options serve as a reference point so that decision makers normally 
stick with this option due to loss aversion (Johnson et al., 2007; Weber 
et al., 2007). ‘Green’ energy defaults have been found to be very effec-
tive in lab studies involving choices between different lighting tech-
nologies (Dinner et al., 2011), suggesting that environmentally friendly 
and cost-effective energy efficient technology will find greater deploy-
ment if it were to show up as the default option in building codes and 
other regulatory contexts. Green defaults are desirable policy options 
because they guide decision makers towards individual and social 
welfare maximizing options without reducing choice autonomy. In a 
field study, German utility customers adopted green energy defaults, a 
passive choice that persisted over time and was not changed by price 
feedback (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008). Moser (2010) provides 
other ways to frame climate change information and response options 
in ways consistent with the communication goal and characteristics of 
the audience.
2�4�3�2 Focus on the short term and the here-and-now
Finite attention and processing capacity imply that unaided intuitive 
choices are restricted in their scope. This makes individuals susceptible 
to different types of myopia or short-sightedness with respect to their 
decisions on whether to invest in measures they would consider cost-
effective if they engaged in deliberative thinking (Weber and Johnson, 
2009; Kunreuther et al., 2013b).
Present bias and quasi-hyperbolic time discounting 
Normative models suggest that future costs and benefits should be 
evaluated using an exponential discount function, that is, a constant 
discount rate per time period (i. e., exponentially), where the discount 
rate should reflect the decision maker’s opportunity cost of money (for 
more details see Section 3.6.2). In reality, people discount future costs 
or benefits much more sharply and at a non-constant rate (i. e., hyper-
bolically), so that delaying an immediate receipt of a benefit is viewed 
much more negatively than if a similar delay occurs at a future point in 
time (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992). Laibson (1997) characterized this 
pattern by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, with two parameters: 
(1) present bias, i. e., a discount applied to all non-immediate outcomes 
regardless how far into the future they occur, and (2) a rational dis-
counting parameter. The model retains much of the analytical tracta-
bility of exponential discounting, while capturing the key qualitative 
feature of hyperbolic discounting.
Failure to invest in protective measures 
In the management of climate-related natural hazards such as flood-
ing, an extensive empirical literature reveals that adoption rates of 
protective measures by the general public are much lower than if indi-
viduals had engaged in deliberative thinking by making relevant trad-
eoffs between expected costs and benefits. Thus, few people living in 
163
Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies
2
Chapter 2
flood prone areas in the United States voluntarily purchase flood insur-
ance, even when it is offered at highly subsidized premiums under the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) (Kunreuther et al., 1978). In 
the context of climate change mitigation, many efficient responses like 
investments in household energy efficiency are not adopted because 
decision makers focus unduly on the upfront costs of these measures 
(due to hyperbolic discounting amplified by loss aversion) and weight 
the future benefits of these investments less than predicted by norma-
tive models (see Sections 2.6.4.3 and 3.10). The failure of consumers 
to buy fuel-efficient cars because of their higher upfront costs (Section 
8.3.5) is another example of this behaviour.
At a country or community level, the upfront costs of mitigating CO2 
emissions or of building seawalls to reduce the effects of sea level rise 
loom large due to loss aversion, while the uncertain and future ben-
efits of such actions are more heavily discounted than predicted by 
normative models. Such accounting of present and future costs and 
benefits on the part of consumers and policymakers might make it dif-
ficult for them to justify these investments today and arrive at long-
term sustainable decisions (Weber, 2013).
Focus on short-term goals
Krantz and Kunreuther (2007) emphasize the importance of goals 
and plans as a basis for making decisions. In the context of climate 
change, protective or mitigating actions often require sacrificing 
short-term goals that are highly weighted in people’s choices in order 
to meet more abstract, distant goals that are typically given very low 
weight. A strong focus on short-term goals (e. g., immediate survival) 
may have been helpful as humans evolved, but may have negative 
consequences in the current environment where risks and challenges 
are more complex and solutions to problems such as climate change 
require a focus on long time horizons. Weber et al. (2007) succeeded 
in drastically reducing people’s discounting of future rewards by 
prompting them to first generate arguments for deferring consump-
tion, contrary to their natural inclination to focus initially on rationales 
for immediate consumption. To deal with uncertainty about future 
objective circumstances as well as subjective evaluations, one can 
adopt multiple points of view (Jones and Preston, 2011) or multiple 
frames of reference (De Boer et  al., 2010); a generalization of the 
IPCC’s scenario approach to an uncertain climate future is discussed 
in Chapter 6.
Mental accounting as a protection against short-term focus
People often mentally set up separate ‘accounts’ for different classes 
of expenditures and do not treat money as fungible between these 
accounts (Thaler, 1999). Mental accounts for different expenditures 
serve as effective budgeting and self-control devices for decision mak-
ers with limited processing capacity and self-control. A focus on short-
term needs and goals can easily deplete financial resources, leaving not 
enough for long(er)-term goals. Placing a limit on short-term spending 
prevents this from happening. But such a heuristic also has a down-
side by unduly limiting people’s willingness to invest in climate change 
mitigation or adaptation measures (e. g., flood proofing or solar pan-
els) that exceed their allocated budget for this account, regardless of 
future benefits. Such constraints (real or mental) often lead to the use 
of lexicographic (rather than compensatory) choice processes, where 
option sets are created or eliminated sequentially, based on a series of 
criteria of decreasing importance (Payne et al., 1988).
Mental accounting at a nonfinancial level may also be responsible for 
rebound effects of a more psychological nature, in addition to the eco-
nomically based rebound effects discussed in Section 8.3.5. Rebound 
effects describe the increase in energy usage that sometimes fol-
lows improvements in household, vehicle, or appliance efficiency. For 
example, households who weatherize their homes tend to increase 
their thermostat settings during the winter afterwards, resulting in a 
decrease in energy savings relative to what is technologically achiev-
able (Hirst et al., 1985). While rebound effects on average equal only 
10 – 30 % of the achievable savings, and therefore do not cancel out 
the benefits of efficiency upgrades (Ehrhardt-Martinez and Laitner, 
2010), they are significant and may result from fixed mental accounts 
that people have for environmentally responsible behaviour. Having 
fulfilled their self-imposed quota by a particular action allows decision 
makers to move on to other goals, a behaviour also sometimes referred 
to as the single-action bias (Weber, 2006).
2�4�3�3 Aversion to risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity
Most people are averse to risk and to uncertainty and ambiguity when 
making choices. More familiar options tend to be seen as less risky, all 
other things being equal, and thus more likely to be selected (Figner 
and Weber, 2011).
Certainty effect or uncertainty aversion
Prospect theory formalizes a regularity related to people’s perceptions 
of certain versus probabilistic prospects. People overweight outcomes 
they consider certain, relative to outcomes that are merely proba-
ble — a phenomenon labelled the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979). This frequently observed behaviour can explain why the 
certain upfront costs of adaptation or mitigation actions are viewed as 
unattractive when compared to the uncertain future benefits of under-
taking such actions (Kunreuther et al., 2013b).
Ambiguity aversion
Given the high degree of uncertainty or ambiguity in most forecasts 
of future climate change impacts and the effects of different mitiga-
tion or adaptation strategies, it is important to consider not only deci-
sion makers’ risk attitudes, but also attitudes towards ambiguous out-
comes. The Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) revealed that, in addition 
to being risk averse, most decision makers are also ambiguity averse, 
that is, they prefer choice options with well-specified probabilities 
over options where the probabilities are uncertain. Heath and Tversky 
(1991) demonstrated, however, that ambiguity aversion is not present 
when decision makers believe they have expertise in the domain of 
choice. For example, in contrast to the many members of the general 
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public who consider themselves to be experts in sports or the stock 
market, relatively few people believe themselves to be highly compe-
tent in environmentally relevant technical domains such as the trad-
eoffs between hybrid electric versus conventional gasoline engines in 
cars, so they are likely to be ambiguity averse. Farmers who feel less 
competent with respect to their understanding of new technology are 
more ambiguity averse and less likely to adopt farming innovations (in 
Peru; Engle-Warnick and Laszlo, 2006; and in the USA; Barham et al., 
2014). With respect to the likelihood of extreme events, such as natural 
disasters, insurers feel they do not have special expertise in estimating 
the likelihood of these events so they also tend to be ambiguity averse 
and set premiums that are considerably higher than if they had more 
certainty with respect to the likelihood of their occurrence (Kunreuther 
et al., 1993; Cabantous et al., 2011).
2�4�4 Learning
The ability to change expectations and behaviour in response to new 
information is an important survival skill, especially in uncertain and 
non-stationary environments. Bayesian updating characterizes learning 
when one engages in deliberative thinking. Individuals who engage 
in intuitive thinking are also highly responsive to new and especially 
recent feedback and information, but treat the data differently than 
that implied by Bayesian updating (Weber et al., 2004).
Availability bias and the role of salience
People’s intuitive assessment of the likelihood of an uncertain event 
is often based on the ease with which instances of its occurrence can 
be brought to mind, a mechanism called availability by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973). Sunstein (2006) discusses the use of the availabil-
ity heuristics in response to climate change risks and how it differs 
among groups, cultures, and nations. Availability is strongly influenced 
by recent personal experience and can lead to an underestimation of 
low-probability events (e. g., typhoons, floods, or droughts) before they 
occur, and their overestimation after an extreme event has occurred. 
The resulting availability bias can explain why individuals first pur-
chase insurance after a disaster has occurred and cancel their policies 
several years later, as observed for earthquake (Kunreuther et al., 1978) 
and flood insurance (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2012). It is likely that most 
of these individuals had not suffered any losses during this period 
and considered the insurance to be a poor investment. It is difficult 
to convince insured individuals that the best return on their policy is 
no return at all. They should celebrate not having suffered a loss (Kun-
reuther et al., 2013c).
Linear thinking
A majority of people perceive climate in a linear fashion that reflects 
two common biases (Sterman and Sweeney, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009; 
Dutt and Gonzalez, 2011). First, people often rely on the correlation 
heuristic, which means that people wrongly infer that an accumulation 
(CO2 concentration) follows the same path as the inflow (CO2 emis-
sions). This implies that cutting emissions will quickly reduce the con-
centration and damages from climate change (Sterman and Sweeney, 
2007). According to Dutt (2011) people who rely on this heuristic likely 
demonstrate wait-and-see behaviour on policies that mitigate climate 
change because they significantly underestimate the delay between 
reductions in CO2 emissions and in the CO2 concentration. Sterman and 
Sweeny (2007) show that people‘s wait-and-see behaviour on mitiga-
tion policies is also related to a second bias whereby people incorrectly 
infer that atmospheric CO2 concentration can be stabilized even when 
emissions exceeds absorption.
Linear thinking also leads people to draw incorrect conclusions from 
nonlinear metrics, like the miles-per-gallon (mpg) ratings of vehicles’ 
gasoline consumption in North America (Larrick and Soll, 2008). When 
given a choice between upgrading to a 15-mpg car from a 12-mpg car, 
or to a 50-mpg car from a 29-mpg car, most people choose the latter 
option. However, for 100 miles driven under both options, it is easily 
shown that the first upgrade option saves more fuel (1.6 gallons for 
every 100 miles driven) than the second upgrade option (1.4 gallons 
for every 100 miles driven).
Effects of personal experience
Learning from personal experience is well predicted by reinforcement 
learning models (Weber et al., 2004). Such models describe and predict 
why the general public is less concerned about low-probability high-
impact climate risks than climate scientists would suggest is warranted 
by the evidence (Gonzalez and Dutt, 2011). These learning models also 
capture the volatility of the public’s concern about climate change 
over time, for example in reaction to the personal experience of local 
weather abnormalities (an abnormal cold spell or heat wave) that have 
been shown to influence belief in climate change (Li et al., 2011).
Most people do not differentiate very carefully between weather, cli-
mate (average weather over time), and climate variability (variations 
in weather over time). People confound climate and weather in part 
because they have personal experience with weather and weather 
abnormalities but little experience with climate change, an abstract 
statistical concept. They thus utilize weather events in making judg-
ments about climate change (Whitmarsh, 2008). This confusion has 
been observed in countries as diverse as the United States (Bostrom 
et  al., 1994; Cullen, 2010) and Ethiopia (BBC World Service Trust, 
2009).
Personal experience can differ between individuals as a function of 
their location, history, and / or socio-economic circumstances (Figner 
and Weber, 2011). Greater familiarity with climate risks, unless accom-
panied by alarming negative consequences, could actually lead to a 
reduction rather than an increase in the perceptions of its riskiness 
(Kloeckner, 2011). On the other hand, people’s experience can make 
climate a more salient issue. For example, changes in the timing and 
extent of freezing and melting (and associated effects on sea ice, flora, 
and fauna) have been experienced since the 1990s in the American 
and Canadian Arctic and especially indigenous communities (Laidler, 
2006), leading to increased concern with climate change because tra-
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ditional prediction mechanisms no longer can explain these phenom-
ena (Turner and Clifton, 2009).
People’s expectations of change (or stability) in climate variables also 
affect their ability to detect trends in probabilistic environments. For 
instance, farmers in Illinois were asked to recall growing season tem-
perature or precipitation statistics for seven preceding years. Farmers 
who believed that their region was affected by climate change recalled 
precipitation and temperature trends consistent with this expectation, 
whereas farmers who believed in a constant climate, recalled precipita-
tions and temperatures consistent with that belief (Weber, 1997). Rec-
ognizing that beliefs shape perception and memory provides insight 
into why climate change expectations and concerns vary between seg-
ments of the US population with different political ideologies (Leise-
rowitz et al., 2008).
The evidence is mixed when we examine whether individuals learn 
from past experience with respect to investing in adaptation or miti-
gation measures that are likely to be cost-effective. Even after the 
devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons in the United States, a 
large number of residents in high-risk areas had still not invested in 
relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures, nor had they under-
taken emergency preparedness measures (Goodnough, 2006). Surveys 
conducted in Alaska and Florida, regions where residents have been 
exposed more regularly to physical evidence of climate change, show 
greater concern and willingness to take action (ACI, 2004; Leiserowitz 
and Broad, 2008; Mozumder et al., 2011).
A recent study assessed perceptions and beliefs about climate change of 
a representative sample of the Britain public (some of whom had expe-
rienced recent flooding in their local area). It also asked whether they 
would reduce personal energy use to reduce greenhouse gas emission 
(Spence et al., 2011). Concern about climate change and willingness to 
take action was greater in the group of residents who had experienced 
recent flooding. Even though the flooding was only a single and local 
data point, this group also reported less uncertainty about whether cli-
mate change was really happening than those who did not experience 
flooding recently, illustrating the strong influence of personal experi-
ence. Other studies fail to find a direct effect of personal experience with 
flooding generating concern about climate risks (Whitmarsh, 2008).
Some researchers find that personal experience with ill health from air 
pollution affects perceptions of and behavioural responses to climate 
risks (Bord et  al., 2000; Whitmarsh, 2008), with the negative effects 
from air pollution creating stronger pro-environmental values. Myers 
et  al. (2012) looked at the role of experiential learning versus moti-
vated reasoning among highly engaged individuals and those less 
engaged in the issue of climate change. Low-engaged individuals 
were more likely to be influenced by their perceived personal experi-
ence of climate change than by their prior beliefs, while those highly 
engaged in the issue (on both sides of the climate issue) were more 
likely to interpret their perceived personal experience in a manner that 
strengthens their pre-existing beliefs.
Indigenous climate change knowledge contributions from Africa 
(Orlove et al., 2010), the Arctic (Gearheard et al., 2009), Australia 
(Green et al., 2010), or the Pacific Islands (Lefale, 2010), derive from 
accumulated and transmitted experience and focus mostly on pre-
dicting seasonal or interannual climate variability. Indigenous knowl-
edge can supplement scientific knowledge in geographic areas with 
a paucity of data (Green and Raygorodetsky, 2010) and can guide 
knowledge generation that reduces uncertainty in areas that matter 
for human responses (ACI, 2004). Traditional ecological knowledge is 
embedded in value-institutions and belief systems related to historical 
modes of experimentation and is transferred from generation to gen-
eration (Pierotti, 2011).
Underweighting of probabilities and threshold models of 
choice
The probability weighting function of prospect theory indicates that 
low probabilities tend to be overweighted relative to their objective 
probability unless they are perceived as being so low that they are 
ignored because they are below the decision maker’s threshold level 
of concern. Prior to a disaster, people often perceive the likelihood of 
catastrophic events occurring as below their threshold level of con-
cern, a form of intuitive thinking in the sense that one doesn’t have 
to reflect on the consequences of a catastrophic event (Camerer and 
Kunreuther, 1989). The need to take steps today to deal with future cli-
mate change presents a challenge to individuals who are myopic. They 
are likely to deal with this challenge by using a threshold model that 
does not require any action for risks below this level. The problem is 
compounded by the inability of individuals to distinguish between low 
likelihoods that differ by one or even two orders of magnitude (e. g., 
between 1 in 100 and 1 in 10,000) (Kunreuther et al., 2001).
2�4�5 Linkages between different levels of 
decision making
Social amplification of risk
Hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural 
processes in ways that may amplify or attenuate public responses to 
the risk or risk event by generating emotional responses and other 
biases associated with intuitive thinking. Amplification may occur 
when scientists, news media, cultural groups, interpersonal networks, 
and other forms of communication provide risk information. The ampli-
fied risk leads to behavioural responses, which, in turn, may result in 
secondary impacts such as the stigmatization of a place that has expe-
rienced an adverse event (Kasperson et al., 1988; Flynn et al., 2001). 
The general public’s overall concern about climate change is influ-
enced, in part, by the amount of media coverage the issue receives as 
well as the personal and collective experience of extreme weather in a 
given place (Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Brulle et al., 2012).
Social norms and social comparisons
Individuals’ choices are often influenced by other people’s behaviour, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty. Adherence to formal rules 
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(e. g., standard operating procedures or best practices in organizations) 
or informal rules of conduct is an important way in which we  intui-
tively decide between different courses of action (Weber and Linde-
mann, 2007). “When in doubt, copy what the majority is doing” is not 
a bad rule to follow in many situations, as choices adopted by oth-
ers are assumed to be beneficial and safe (Weber, 2013). In fact, such 
social imitation can lead to social norms. Section 3.10.2 describes the 
effects of social norms in greater detail. Goldstein et al. (2008) demon-
strate the effectiveness of providing descriptive norms (“this is what 
most people do”) versus injunctive norms (“this is what you should 
be doing”) to reduce energy use in US hotels. The application of social 
norms to encourage investment in energy efficient products and tech-
nology is discussed in Section 2.6.5.3.
Social comparisons are another effective way to evaluate and learn 
about the quality of obtained outcomes (Weber, 2004). It helps, for 
example, to compare one’s own energy consumption to that of neigh-
bours in similar-sized apartments or houses to see how effective 
efforts at energy conservation have been. Such non-price interventions 
can substantially change consumer behaviour, with effects equivalent 
to that of a short-run electricity price increase of 11 % to 20 % (Alcott, 
2011). Social comparisons, imitation, and norms may be necessary to 
bring about lifestyle changes that are identified in Chapter 9 as reduc-
ing GHG emissions from the current levels (Sanquist et al., 2012).
Social learning and cultural transmission
Section 9.3.10 suggests that indigenous building practices in many 
parts of the world provide important lessons for affordable low-
energy housing design and that developed countries can learn from 
traditional building practices, transmitted over generations, the social-
scale equivalent of ‘intuitive’ processing and learning at the individual 
level.
Risk protection by formal (e� g�, insurance) and informal 
 institutions (e� g�, social networks) 
Depending on their cultural and institutional context, people can pro-
tect themselves against worst-case and / or potentially catastrophic 
economic outcomes either by purchasing insurance (Kunreuther et al., 
2013c) or by developing social networks that will help bail them out or 
assist them in the recovery process (Weber and Hsee, 1998). Individual-
ist cultures favour formal insurance contracts, whereas collectivist soci-
eties make more use of informal mutual insurance via social networks. 
This distinction between risk protection by either formal or informal 
means exists at the individual level and also at the firm level, e. g., the 
chaebols in Korea or the keiretsus in Japan (Gilson and Roe, 1993).
Impact of uncertainty on coordination and competition
Adaptation and especially mitigation responses require coordination 
and cooperation between individuals, groups, or countries for many 
of the choices associated with climate change. The possible outcomes 
often can be viewed as a game between players who are concerned 
with their own payoffs but who may still be mindful of social goals and 
objectives. In this sense they can be viewed in the context of a pris-
oners’ dilemma (PD) or social dilemma. Recent experimental research 
on two-person PD games reveals that individuals are more likely to 
be cooperative when payoffs are deterministic than when the out-
comes are probabilistic. A key factor explaining this difference is that 
in a deterministic PD game, the losses of both persons will always be 
greater when they both do not cooperate than when they do. When 
outcomes are probabilistic there is some chance that the losses will be 
smaller when both parties do not cooperate than when they do, even 
though the expected losses to both players will be greater if they both 
decide not to cooperate than if they both cooperate (Kunreuther et al., 
2009).
In a related set of experiments, Gong et al. (2009) found that groups 
are less cooperative than individuals in a two-person deterministic PD 
game; however, in a stochastic PD game, where defection increased 
uncertainty for both players, groups became more cooperative than 
they were in a deterministic PD game and more cooperative than indi-
viduals in the stochastic PD game. These findings have relevance to 
behaviour with respect to climate change where future outcomes of 
specific policies are uncertain. Consider decisions made by groups of 
individuals, such as when delegations from countries are negotiating 
at the Conference of Parties (COP) to make commitments for reduc-
ing GHG emissions where the impacts on climate change are uncer-
tain. These findings suggest that there is likely to be more cooperation 
between governmental delegations than if each country was repre-
sented by a single decision maker.
Cooperation also plays a crucial role in international climate agree-
ments. There is a growing body of experimental literature that looks at 
individuals’ cooperation when there is uncertainty associated with oth-
ers adopting climate change mitigation measures. Tavoni et al. (2011) 
found that communication across individuals improves the likelihood 
of cooperation. Milinski et al. (2008) observed that the higher the risky 
losses associated with the failure to cooperate in the provision of a 
public good, the higher the likelihood of cooperation. If the target for 
reducing CO2 is uncertain, Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) show in an 
experimental setting that cooperation is less likely than if the target is 
well specified.
2�4�6 Perceptions of climate change risk and 
uncertainty
Empirical social science research shows that the perceptions of climate 
change risks and uncertainties depend not only on external reality but 
also on the observers’ internal states, needs, and the cognitive and 
emotional processes that characterize intuitive thinking. Psychological 
research has documented the prevalence of affective processes in the 
intuitive assessment of risk, depicting them as essentially effort-free 
inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behaviour, especially under 
conditions of uncertainty that are informed and shaped by personal 
experience over time (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Peters et al., 2006).
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Two important psychological risk dimensions have been shown to 
influence people’s intuitive perceptions of health and safety risks 
across numerous studies in multiple countries (Slovic, 1987). The first 
factor, ‘dread risk’, captures emotional reactions to hazards like nuclear 
reactor accidents, or nerve gas accidents, that is, things that make peo-
ple anxious because of a perceived lack of control over exposure to 
the risks and because consequences may be catastrophic. The second 
factor, ‘unknown risk‘, refers to the degree to which a risk (e. g., DNA 
technology) is perceived as new, with unforeseeable consequences 
and with exposures not easily detectable.
Perceptions of the risks associated with a given event or hazard are 
also strongly influenced by personal experience and can therefore dif-
fer between individuals as a function of their location, history, and / or 
socio-economic circumstances (see Box 2.1) (Figner and Weber, 2011). 
Whereas personal exposure to adverse consequences increases fear 
and perceptions of risk, familiarity with a risk can lower perceptions 
of its riskiness unless it is accompanied by alarming negative conse-
quences  (Kloeckner, 2011). Seeing climate change only as a simple 
and gradual change from current to future average temperatures and 
precipitation may make it seem controllable — the non-immediacy 
of the danger seems to provide time to plan and execute protective 
responses (Weber, 2006). These factors suggest that laypersons differ 
in their perception of climate risks more than experts who engage in 
deliberative thinking and estimate the likelihood and consequences of 
climate change utilizing scientific data.
Impact of uncertainties in communicating risk
If the uncertainties associated with climate change and its future 
impact on the physical and social system are not communicated accu-
rately, the general public may misperceive them (Corner and Hahn, 
2009). Krosnick et al. (2006) found that perceptions of the seriousness 
of global warming as a national issue in the United States depended on 
the degree of certainty of respondents as to whether global warming is 
Box 2�1 | Challenges facing developing countries
One of the key findings on developing countries is that non-state 
actors such as tribes, clans, castes, or guilds may be of substantial 
influence on how climate policy choices are made and diffused 
rather than having the locus of decision making at the level of the 
individual or governmental unit. For instance, a farming tribe / caste 
may address the climate risks and uncertainties faced by their com-
munity and opt for a system of crop rotation to retain soil fertil-
ity or shift cultivation to preserve the nutritious state of farmlands. 
Research in developing countries in Africa has shown that people 
may understand probabilistic information better when it is pre-
sented in a group where members have a chance to discuss it (Patt 
et  al., 2005; Roncoli, 2006). This underscores why the risks and 
uncertainty associated with climate change has shifted governmen-
tal responsibility to non-state actors (Rayner, 2007).
In this context, methodologies and decision aids used in individual-
centred western societies for making choices that rely on uncertain 
probabilities and uncertain outcomes may not apply to develop-
ing countries. Furthermore, methodologies, such as expected utility 
theory, assume an individual decision maker whereas in develop-
ing countries, decisions are often made by clans or tribes. In addi-
tion, tools such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis 
and robust decision making may not always be relevant for devel-
oping countries since decisions are often based on social norms, 
traditions, and customs
The adverse effects of climate change on food, water, security, 
and incidences of temperature-influenced diseases (Shah and Lele, 
2011), are further fuelled by a general lack of awareness about 
climate change in developing countries (UNDP, 2007); conse-
quently, policymakers in these countries support a wait-and-see 
attitude toward climate change (Dutt, 2011). Resource allocation 
and investment constraints may also lead policy-makers to post-
pone policy decisions to deal with climate change, as is the case 
with respect to integration of future energy systems in small island 
states (UNFCCC, 2007). The delay may prevent opportunities for 
learning and increase future vulnerabilities. It may also lock in 
countries into infrastructure and technologies that may be difficult 
to alter.
The tension between short- and long-term priorities in low income 
countries is often accentuated by uncertainties in political culture 
and regulatory policies (Rayner, 1993). This may lead to policies 
that are flawed in design and / or implementation or those that 
have unintended negative consequences. For example, subsidies 
for clean fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in a country 
like India often do not reach their intended beneficiaries (the poor), 
and at the same time add a large burden to the exchequer (Gov-
ernment of India, Ministry of Finance, 2012; IISD, 2012).
Other institutional and governance factors impede effective cli-
mate change risk management in developing countries. These 
include lack of experience with insurance (Patt et al., 2010), dearth 
of data, and analytical capacity. A more transparent and effec-
tive civil service would also be helpful, for instance in stimulating 
investments in renewable energy generation capacities (Komen-
dantova et  al., 2012). Financial constraints suggest the impor-
tance of international assistance and private sector contribution to 
implement adaptation and mitigation strategies for dealing with 
climate change in developing countries.
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occurring and will have negative consequences coupled with their belief 
that humans are causing the problem and have the ability to solve it. 
Accurately communicating the degree of uncertainty in both climate 
risks and policy responses is therefore a critically important challenge 
for climate scientists and policymakers (Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011).
Roser-Renouf et al. (2011), building upon the work of Krosnick et al. 
(2006), apply social cognitive theory to develop a model of climate 
advocacy to increase the attention given to climate change in the spirit 
of social amplification of risk. They found that campaigns looking to 
increase the number of citizens contacting elected officials to advocate 
climate policy action should focus on increasing the belief that global 
warming is real, human-caused, a serious risk, and solvable. These four 
key elements, coupled with the understanding that there is strong sci-
entific agreement on global warming (Ding et al., 2011), are likely to 
build issue involvement and support for action to reduce the impacts 
of climate change.
The significant time lags within the climate system and a focus on 
short-term outcomes lead many people to believe global warming 
will have only moderately negative impacts. This view is reinforced 
because adverse consequences are currently experienced only in some 
regions of the world or are not easily attributed to climate change. For 
example, despite the fact that “climate change currently contributes to 
the global burden of disease and premature deaths” (IPCC, 2007) rela-
tively few people make the connection between climate change and 
human health risks.
One challenge is how to facilitate correct inferences about the role of 
climate change as a function of extreme event frequency and sever-
ity. Many parts of the world have seen increases in the frequency and 
magnitude of heat waves and heavy precipitation events (IPCC, 2012). 
In the United States, a large majority of Americans believe that climate 
change exacerbated extreme weather events (Leiserowitz et al., 2012). 
That said, the perception that the impact of climate change is neither 
immediate nor local persists (Leiserowitz et al., 2008), leading many 
to think it rational to advocate a wait-and-see approach to emissions 
reductions (Sterman, 2008; Dutt and Gonzalez, 2013).
Differences in education and numeracy
Individual and group differences in education and training and the 
resulting different cognitive and affective processes have additional 
implications for risk communication. It may help to supplement the 
use of words to characterize the likelihood of an outcome recom-
mended by the current IPCC Guidance Note (GN) with numeric prob-
ability ranges (Budescu et al., 2009). Patt and Dessai (2005) show that 
in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), words that characterized 
numerical probabilities were interpreted by decision makers in incon-
sistent and often context-specific ways, a phenomenon with a long his-
tory in cognitive psychology (Wallsten et al., 1986; Weber and Hilton, 
1990). These context-specific interpretations of probability words are 
deeply rooted, as evidenced by the fact that the likelihood of using 
the intended interpretation of TAR probability words did not differ with 
level of expertise (attendees of a UN COP conference versus students) 
or as a function of whether respondents had read the TAR instructions 
that specify how the probability words characterized numerical prob-
abilities (Patt and Dessai, 2005).
Numeracy, the ability to reason with numbers and other mathemati-
cal concepts, is a particularly important individual and group differ-
ence in this context as it has implications for the presentation of likeli-
hood information using either numbers (for example, 90 %) or words 
(for example, “very likely” or “likely”) or different graphs or diagrams 
(Peters et al., 2006; Mastrandrea et al., 2011). Using personal experi-
ence with climate variables has been shown to be effective in com-
municating the impact of probabilities (e. g., of below-, about-, and 
above-normal rainfall in an El Ni~no year) to decision makers with low 
levels of numeracy, for example subsistence farmers in Zimbabwe (Patt 
et al., 2005).
2.5 Tools and decision 
aids for analysing 
 uncertainty and risk
This section examines how more formal approaches can assist deci-
sion makers in engaging in more deliberative thinking with respect to 
climate change policies when faced with the risks and uncertainties 
characterized in Section 2.3.
2�5�1 Expected utility theory
Expected utility [E(U)] theory (Ramsey, 1926; von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944; Savage, 1954); remains the standard approach for pro-
viding normative guidelines against which other theories of individual 
decision making under risk and uncertainty are benchmarked. Accord-
ing to the E(U) model, the solution to a decision problem under uncer-
tainty is reached by the following four steps:
1. Define a set of possible decision alternatives.
2. Quantify uncertainties on possible states of the world.
3. Value possible outcomes of the decision alternatives as utilities.
4. Choose the alternative with the highest expected utility.
This section clarifies the applicability of expected utility theory to the 
climate change problem, highlighting its potentials and limitations.
2�5�1�1 Elements of the theory
E(U) theory is based on a set of axioms that are claimed to have nor-
mative rather than descriptive validity. Based on these axioms, a per-
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son’s subjective probability and utility function can be determined by 
observing preferences in structured choice situations. These axioms 
have been debated, strengthened, and relaxed by economists, psy-
chologists, and other social scientists over the years. The axioms have 
been challenged by controlled laboratory experiments and field stud-
ies discussed in Section 2.4 but they remain the basis for parsing deci-
sion problems and recommending options that maximize expected 
utility.
2�5�1�2 How can expected utility improve decision 
making?
E(U) theory provides guidelines for individual choice, such as a farmer 
deciding what crops to plant or an entrepreneur deciding whether to 
invest in wind technology. These decision makers would apply E(U) the-
ory by following the four steps above. The perceptions and responses 
to risk and uncertainty discussed in Section 2.5 provide a rationale 
for undertaking deliberative thinking before making final choices. 
More specifically, a structured approach, such as the E(U) model, can 
reduce the impact of probabilistic biases and simplified decision rules 
that characterize intuitive thinking. At the same time, the limitations 
of E(U) must be clearly understood, as the procedures for determining 
an optimal choice do not capture the full range of information about 
outcomes and their risks and uncertainties.
Subjective versus objective probability 
In the standard E(U) model, each individual has his / her own subjec-
tive probability estimates. When there is uncertainty on the scientific 
evidence, experts’ probability estimates may diverge from each other, 
sometimes significantly. With respect to climate change, observed rela-
tive frequencies are always preferred when suitable sets of observa-
tions are accessible. When these data are not available, one may want 
to utilize structured expert judgment for quantifying uncertainty (see 
Section 2.5.7).
Individual versus social choice 
In applying E(U) theory to problems of social choice, a number of 
issues arise. Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that groups of ratio-
nal individuals deciding by majority rule do not exhibit rational prefer-
ences. Using a social utility or social welfare function to determine an 
optimal course of action for society requires some method of mea-
suring society’s preferences. In the absence of these data the social 
choice problem is not a simple exercise of maximizing expected utility. 
In this case, a plurality of approaches involving different aggregations 
of individual utilities and probabilities may best aid decision makers. 
The basis and use of the social welfare function are discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4.6.
Normative versus descriptive
As noted above, the rationality axioms of E(U) are claimed to have 
normative as opposed to descriptive validity. The paradoxes of Allais 
(1953) and Ellsberg (1961) reveal choice behaviour incompatible 
with E(U); whether this requires modifications of the normative the-
ory is a subject of debate. McCrimmon (1968) found that business 
executives willingly corrected violations of the axioms when they 
were made aware of them. Other authors (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Schmeidler, 1989; Quiggin, 1993; Wakker, 2010) account for 
such paradoxical choice behaviour by transforming the probabilities 
of outcomes into decision weight probabilities that play the role of 
likelihood in computing optimal choices but do not obey the laws 
of probability. However, Wakker (2010, p. 350) notes that decision 
weighting fails to describe some empirically observed behavioural 
patterns. 
2�5�2 Decision analysis
2�5�2�1 Elements of the theory
Decision analysis is a formal approach for choosing between alterna-
tives under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The foundations of deci-
sion analysis are provided by the axioms of expected utility theory. The 
methodology for choosing between alternatives consists of the follow-
ing elements that are described in more detail in Keeney (1993):
1. Structure the decision problem by generating alternatives and 
specifying values and objectives or criteria that are important to 
the decision maker.
2. Assess the possible impacts of different alternatives by determin-
ing the set of possible consequences and the probability of each 
occurring.
3. Determine preferences of the relevant decision maker by develop-
ing an objective function that considers attitudes toward risk and 
aggregates the weighted objectives.
4. Evaluate and compare alternatives by computing the expected util-
ity associated with each alternative. The alternative with the high-
est expected utility is the most preferred one.
To illustrate the application of decision analysis, consider a homeowner 
that is considering whether to invest in energy efficient technology as 
part of their lifestyle options as depicted in Figure 2.2:
1. The person focuses on two alternatives: (A1) Maintain the status 
quo, and (A2) Invest in solar panels, and has two objectives: (O1) 
Minimize cost, and (O2) Assist in reducing global warming.
2. The homeowner would then determine the impacts of A1 and A2 
on the objectives O1 and O2 given the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the impact of climate change on energy usage as 
well as the price of energy.
3. The homeowner would then consider his or her attitude toward 
risks and then combine O1 and O2 into a multiattribute utility 
function.
4. The homeowner would then compare the expected utility of A1 
and A2, choosing the one that had the highest expected utility.
170
Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies
2
Chapter 2
2�5�2�2 How can decision analysis improve  decision 
making?
Decision analysis enables one to undertake sensitivity analyses with 
respect to the uncertainties associated with the various consequences 
and to different value structures. Suppose alternative A1 had the high-
est expected utility. The homeowner could determine when the deci-
sion to invest in solar panels would be preferred to maintaining the 
status quo by asking questions such as: 
•	 What would the minimum annual savings in energy expenses have 
to be over the next 10 years to justify investing in solar panels?
•	 What is the fewest number of years one would have to reside in 
the house to justify investing in solar panels?
•	 What impact will different levels of global warming have on the 
expected costs of energy over the next 10 years for the home-
owner to want to invest in solar panels?
•	 How will changing the relative weights placed on minimizing cost 
(O1) and assisting in reducing global warming (O2) affect the 
expected utility of A1 and A2?
2�5�3 Cost-benefit analysis 
2�5�3�1 Elements of the theory 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) compares the costs and benefits of differ-
ent alternatives with the broad purpose of facilitating more efficient 
allocation of society’s resources. When applied to government deci-
sions, CBA can indicate the alternative that has the highest social net 
present value based on a discount rate, normally constant over time, 
that converts future benefits and costs to their present values (Board-
man et  al., 2005; see also the extensive discussion in Section 3.6). 
Social, rather than private, costs and benefits are compared, including 
those affecting future generations (Brent, 2006). In this regard, bene-
fits across individuals are assumed to be additive. Distributional issues 
may be addressed by putting different weights on specific groups to 
reflect their relative importance. Under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty, one determines expected costs and benefits by weighting out-
comes by their likelihoods of occurrence. In this sense, the analysis is 
similar to expected utility theory and decision analysis discussed in 
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
CBA can be extremely useful when dealing with well-defined problems 
that involve a limited number of actors who make choices among dif-
ferent mitigation or adaptation options. For example, a region could 
examine the benefits and costs over the next fifty years of building 
levees to reduce the likelihood and consequences of flooding given 
projected sea level rise due to climate change.
CBA can also provide a framework for defining a range of global 
long-term targets on which to base negotiations across countries 
(see for example Stern, 2007). However, CBA faces major challenges 
when defining the optimal level of global mitigation actions for the 
following three reasons: (1) the need to determine and aggregate 
individual welfare, (2) the presence of distributional and intertempo-
ral issues, and (3) the difficulty in assigning probabilities to uncertain 
climate change impacts. The limits of CBA in the context of climate 
change are discussed at length in Sections 3.6 and 3.9. The discus-
sion that follows focuses on challenges posed by risk and uncer-
tainty.
2�5�3�2 How can CBA improve decision making?
Cost-benefit analysis assumes that the decision maker(s) will even-
tually choose between well-specified alternatives. To illustrate this 
point, consider a region that is considering measures that coastal vil-
lages in hazard-prone areas can undertake to reduce future flood risks 
that are expected to increase in part due to sea level rise. The different 
options range from building a levee (at the community level) to pro-
viding low interest loans to encourage residents and businesses in the 
community to invest in adaptation measures to reduce future damage 
to their property (at the level of an individual or household).
Some heuristics and resulting biases discussed in the context of 
expected utility theory also apply to cost-benefit analysis under uncer-
tainty. For example, the key decision maker, the mayor, may utilize a 
threshold model of choice by assuming that the region will not be 
subject to flooding because there have been no floods or hurricanes 
during the past 25 years. By relying solely on intuitive processes there 
would be no way to correct this behaviour until the next disaster 
occurred, at which time the mayor would belatedly want to protect the 
community. The mayor and his advisors may also focus on short-time 
horizons, and hence do not wish to incur the high upfront costs associ-
ated with building flood protection measures such as dams or levees. 
They are unconvinced that that such an investment will bring signifi-
cant enough benefits over the first few years when these city officials 
are likely to be held accountable for the expenditures associated with 
a decision to go forward on the project.
Cost-benefit analysis can highlight the importance of considering 
the likelihood of events over time and the need to discount impacts 
exponentially rather than hyperbolically, so that future time periods 
are given more weight in the decision process. In addition, CBA can 
highlight the tradeoffs between efficient resource allocation and distri-
butional issues as a function of the relative weights assigned to differ-
ent stakeholders (e. g., low income and well-to-do households in flood 
prone areas).
2�5�3�3 Advantages and limitations of CBA
The main advantage of CBA in the context of climate change is that it is 
internally coherent and based on the axioms of expected utility theory. 
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As the prices used to aggregate costs and benefits are the outcomes 
of market activity, CBA is, at least in principle, a tool reflecting people’s 
preferences. Although this is one of the main arguments in favour of 
CBA (Tol, 2003), this line of reasoning can also be the basis for rec-
ommending that this approach not be employed for making choices if 
market prices are unavailable. Indeed, many impacts associated with 
climate change are not valued in any market and are therefore hard to 
measure in monetary terms. Omitting these impacts distorts the cost-
benefit relationship.
Several ethical and methodological critiques have been put forward 
with respect to the application of CBA to climate policy (Charlesworth 
and Okereke, 2010; Caney, 2011). For example, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the potential impacts of climate change, including possible 
irreversible and catastrophic effects on ecosystems, and their asym-
metric distribution around the planet, suggests CBA may be inappro-
priate for assessing optimal responses to climate change in these cir-
cumstances.
A strong and recurrent argument against CBA (Azar and Lindgren, 
2003; Tol, 2003; Weitzman, 2009, 2011) relates to its failure in dealing 
with infinite (negative) expected utilities arising from low-probability 
catastrophic events often referred to as ‘fat tails’. In these situations, 
CBA is unable to produce meaningful results, and thus more robust 
techniques are required. The debate concerning whether fat tails are 
indeed relevant to the problem at hand is still unsettled (see for exam-
ple Pindyck, 2011). Box 3.9 in Chapter 3 addresses the fat tail problem 
and suggests the importance of understanding the impacts associated 
with low probability, high impact climate change scenarios in evaluat-
ing alternative mitigation strategies.
One way to address the fat tail problem would be to focus on the 
potential catastrophic consequences of low-probability, high-impact 
events in developing GHG emissions targets and to specify a thresh-
old probability and a threshold loss. One can then remove events from 
consideration that are below these critical values in determining what 
mitigation and / or adaptation to adopt as part of a risk management 
strategy for dealing with climate change (Kunreuther et  al., 2013c). 
Insurers and reinsurers specify these thresholds and use them to deter-
mine the amount of coverage that they are willing to offer against 
a particular risk. They then diversify their portfolio of policies so the 
annual probability of a major loss is below a pre-specified thresh-
old level of concern (e. g., 1 in 1000) (Kunreuther et al., 2013c). This 
approach is in the spirit of a classic paper by Roy (1952) on safety-
first behaviour and can be interpreted as an application of probabilis-
tic cost-effectiveness analysis (i. e., chance constrained programming) 
discussed in the next section. It was applied in a somewhat different 
manner to environmental policy by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) who con-
tended that “a safe minimum standard is frequently a valid and rel-
evant criterion for conservation policy.” 
One could also view uncertainty or risk associated with different 
options as one of the many criteria on which alternatives should be 
evaluated. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is sometimes proposed to 
overcome some of the limitations of CBA (see more on its basic fea-
tures in Chapter 3 and for applications in Chapter 6). MCA implies that 
the different criteria or attributes should not be aggregated by convert-
ing all of them into monetary units. MCA techniques commonly apply 
numerical analysis in two stages:
•	 Scoring: for each option and criterion, the expected consequences 
of each option are assigned a numerical score on a strength of 
preference scale. More (less) preferred options score higher (lower) 
on the scale. In practice, scales often extend from 0 to 100, where 
0 is assigned to a real or hypothetical least preferred option, and 
100 is assigned to a real or hypothetical most preferred option. All 
options considered in the MCA would then fall between 0 and 100.
•	 Weighting: numerical weights are assigned to define their relative 
performance on a chosen scale that will often range from 0 (no 
importance) to 1 (highest importance) (Dodgson et al., 2009).
2�5�4 Cost-effectiveness analysis
2�5�4�1 Elements of the theory
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a tool based on constrained optimi-
zation for comparing policies designed to meet a pre-specified target. 
The target can be defined through CBA, by applying a specific guide-
line such as the precautionary principle (see Section 2.5.5), or by speci-
fying a threshold level of concern or environmental standard in the 
spirit of the safety-first models discussed above. The target could be 
chosen without the need to formally specify impacts and their respec-
tive probabilities. It could also be based on an ethical principle such as 
minimizing the worst outcome, in the spirit of a Rawlsian fair agree-
ment, or as a result of political and societal negotiation processes.
Cost-effectiveness analysis does not evaluate benefits in monetary 
terms. Rather, it attempts to find the least-cost option that achieves a 
desired quantifiable outcome. In one sense CEA can be seen as a spe-
cial case of CBA in that the technique replaces the criterion of choos-
ing a climate policy based on expected costs and benefits with the 
objective of selecting the option that minimizes the cost of meeting 
an exogenous target (e. g., equilibrium temperature, concentration, or 
emission trajectory).
Like CBA, CEA can be generalized to include uncertainty. One solution 
concept requires the externally set target to be specified with certainty. 
The option chosen is the one that minimizes expected costs. Since 
temperature targets cannot be met with certainty (den Elzen and van 
Vuuren, 2007; Held et al., 2009), a variation of this solution concept 
requires that the likelihood that an exogenous target (e. g., equilib-
rium temperature) will be exceeded is below a pre-defined threshold 
probability. This solution procedure, equivalent to chance constrained 
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programming (CCP) (Charnes and Cooper, 1959), enables one to use 
stochastic programming to examine the impacts of uncertainty with 
respect to the cost of meeting a pre-specified target. Chance con-
strained programming is a conceptually valid decision-analytic frame-
work for examining the likelihood of attaining climate targets when 
the probability distributions characterizing the decision maker’s state 
of knowledge is held constant over time (Held et al., 2009).
2�5�4�2 How can CEA improve decision making?
To illustrate how CEA can be useful, consider a national government 
that wants to set a target for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions in preparation for a meeting of delegates from different countries 
at the Conference of Parties (COP). It knows there is uncertainty as to 
whether specific policy measures will achieve the desired objectives. 
The uncertainties may be related to the outcomes of the forthcoming 
negotiation process at the COP and / or to the uncertain impacts of 
proposed technological innovations in reducing GHG emissions. Cost-
effectiveness analysis could enable the government to assess alterna-
tive mitigation strategies (or energy investment policies) for reduc-
ing GHG emissions in the face of these uncertainties by specifying a 
threshold probability that aggregate GHG emissions will not be greater 
than a pre-specified target level.
2�5�4�3 Advantages and limitations of CEA over CBA
Cost-effectiveness analysis has an advantage over CBA in tackling 
the climate problem in that it does not require formalized knowledge 
about global warming impact functions (Pindyck, 2013). The focus of 
CEA is on more tangible elements, such as energy alternatives, where 
scientific understanding is more established (Stern, 2007). Still, CEA 
does require scientific input on potential risks associated with climate 
change. National and international political processes specify tempera-
ture targets and threshold probabilities that incorporate the prefer-
ences of different actors guided by data from the scientific community. 
The corresponding drawback of CEA is that the choice of the target is 
specified without considering its impact on economic efficiency. Once 
costs to society are assessed and a range of temperature targets is 
considered, one can assess people’s preferences by considering the 
potential benefits and costs associated with different targets. However, 
if costs of a desirable action turn out to be regarded as too high, then 
CEA may not provide sufficient information to support taking action 
now. In this case additional knowledge on the mitigation benefit side 
would be required.
An important application of CEA in the context of climate change is 
evaluating alternative transition pathways that do not violate a pre-
defined temperature target. Since a specific temperature target can-
not be attained with certainty, formulating probabilistic targets as a 
CCP problem is an appropriate solution technique to use. However, 
introducing anticipated future learning so that probability distribu-
tions change over time can lead to infeasible solutions (Eisner et al., 
1971). Since this is a problem with respect to specifying temperature 
targets, Schmidt et  al. (2011) proposed an approach that that com-
bines CEA and CBA. The properties of this hybrid model (labelled ‘cost 
risk analysis’) require further investigation. At this time, CEA through 
the use of CCP represents an informative concept for deriving miti-
gation costs for the case where there is no learning over time. With 
learning, society would be no worse off than the proposed CEA solu-
tion.
2�5�5 The precautionary principle and robust 
decision making
2�5�5�1 Elements of the theory
In the 1970s and 1980s, the precautionary principle was proposed for 
dealing with serious uncertain risks to the natural environment and 
to public health (Vlek, 2010). In its strongest form the precautionary 
principle implies that if an action or policy is suspected of having a risk 
that causes harm to the public or to the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not established. The burden of proof that the activity is not harmful 
falls on the proponent of the activity rather than on the public. A con-
sensus statement to this effect was issued at the Wingspread Confer-
ence on the Precautionary Principle on 26 January 1998.
The precautionary principle allows policymakers to ban products or 
substances in situations where there is the possibility of their caus-
ing harm and / or where extensive scientific knowledge on their risks is 
lacking. These actions can be relaxed only if further scientific findings 
emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will result. An influ-
ential statement of the precautionary principle with respect to climate 
change is principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation.”
Robust decision making (RDM) is a particular set of methods devel-
oped over the last decade to address the precautionary principle in a 
systematic manner. RDM uses ranges or, more formally, sets of plau-
sible probability distributions to describe uncertainty and to evaluate 
how well different policies perform with respect to different outcomes 
arising from these probability distributions. RDM provides decision 
makers with tradeoff curves that allow them to debate how much 
expected performance they are willing to sacrifice in order to improve 
outcomes in worst case scenarios. RDM thus captures the spirit of the 
precautionary principle in a way that illuminates the risks and benefits 
of different policies. Lempert et al. (2006) and Hall et al. (2012) review 
the application of robust approaches to decision making with respect 
to mitigating or adapting to climate change.
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The tolerable windows approach can also be regarded as a ‘robust 
method’. Temperature targets are specified and the bundle of decision 
paths compatible with the targets is characterized. Mathe matically, the 
tolerable windows approach incorporates the features of CEA or CCP 
without optimization. The selection of the relevant targets and the paths 
to achieving it are left to those making the decision. (See Bruckner and 
Zickfeld (2008) for an introduction and an overview to peer-reviewed 
literature on the tolerable windows approach.)
2�5�6 Adaptive management
Adaptive management is an approach to governance that that grew 
out of the field of conservation ecology in the 1970s and incorporates 
mechanisms for reducing uncertainty over time (Holling, 1978; Walters 
and Hilborn, 1978). Paraphrasing the IPCC Special Report on Extreme 
Events (SREX) (IPCC, 2012), adaptive management represents struc-
tured processes for improving decision making and policy over time, 
by incorporating lessons learned. From the theoretical literature, two 
strands of adaptive management have been developed for improving 
decision making under uncertainty: passive and active.
Passive adaptive management (PAM) involves carefully designing 
monitoring systems, at the relevant spatial scales, so as to be able to 
track the performance of policy interventions and improve them over 
time in response to what has been learned. Active adaptive manage-
ment (AAM) extends PAM by designing the interventions themselves 
as controlled experiments, so as to generate new knowledge. For 
example, if a number of political jurisdictions were seeking to imple-
ment support mechanisms for technology deployment, in an AAM 
approach they would deliberately design separate mechanisms that 
are likely to differ across jurisdictions. By introducing such variance 
into the management regime, however, one would collectively learn 
more about how industry and investors respond to a range of interven-
tions. All jurisdictions could then use this knowledge in a later round 
of policymaking, reflecting the public goods character of institutional 
knowledge.
With respect to the application of PAM, Nilsson (2005) reports on a 
case study of Sweden, in which policymakers engaged in repetitive ex 
post analyses of national climate policy, and then responded to the les-
sons learned by modifying their goals and strategies. There are many 
documented cases of PAM applications in the area of climate change 
adaptation (Lawler et al., 2008; Berkes et al., 2000; Berkes and Jolly, 
2001; Joyce et  al., 2009; Armitage, 2011). The information gathering 
and reporting requirements of the UNFCCC are also in the spirit of 
PAM with respect to policy design, as are the diversity of approaches 
implemented for renewable energy support across the states and prov-
inces of North America and the countries in Europe. The combination of 
the variance in action with data gathered about the consequences of 
these actions by government agencies has allowed for robust analysis 
on the relative effectiveness of different instruments (Blok, 2006; Men-
donça, 2007; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). 
Individuals relying on intuitive thinking are unlikely to undertake 
experimentation that leads to new knowledge, as discussed in Section 
2.4.3.1. In theory, adaptive management ought to correct this problem 
by making the goal of learning through experimentation an explicit 
policy goal. Lee (1993) illustrates this point by presenting a paradig-
matic case of AAM designed to increase salmon stocks in the Columbia 
River watershed in the western United States and Canada. In this case, 
there was the opportunity to introduce a number of different manage-
ment regimes on the individual river tributaries, and to reduce uncer-
tainty about salmon population dynamics. As Lee (1993) documented, 
policymakers on the Columbia River were ultimately not able to carry 
through with AAM: local constituencies, valuing their own immediate 
interests over long-term learning in the entire region, played a crucial 
role in blocking it. One could imagine such political and institutional 
issues hindering the application of AAM at a global scale with respect 
to climate change policies.
To date, there are no cases in the literature specifically documenting 
climate change policies explicitly incorporating AAM. However, there 
are a number of examples where policy interventions implicitly fol-
low AAM principles. One of these is promotion of energy research and 
development (R&D). In this case the government invests in a large 
number of potential new technologies, with the expectation that some 
technologies will not prove practical, while others will be successful 
and be supported by funding in the form of incentives such as subsi-
dies (Fischer and Newell, 2008).
2�5�7 Uncertainty analysis techniques
Uncertainty analysis consists of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies (see Box 2.2 for more details). A Qualitative Uncer-
tainty Analysis (QLUA) helps improve the choice process of decision 
makers by providing data in a form that individuals can easily under-
stand. QLUA normally does not require complex calculations so that it 
can be useful in helping to overcome judgmental biases that character-
ize intuitive thinking. QLUA assembles arguments and evidence and 
provides a verbal assessment of plausibility, frequently incorporated in 
a Weight of Evidence (WoE) narrative.
A Quantitative Uncertainty Analysis (QNUA) assigns a joint distribu-
tion to uncertain parameters of a specific model used to characterize 
different phenomena. Quantitative Uncertainty Analysis was pioneered 
in the nuclear sector in 1975 to determine the risks associated with 
nuclear power plants (Rasmussen, 1975). The development of QNUA 
and its prospects for applications to climate change are reviewed by 
Cooke (2012).
2�5�7�1  Structured expert judgment
Structured expert judgment designates methods in which experts 
quantify their uncertainties to build probabilistic input for complex 
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decision problems (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Cooke, 1991; O’Hagan 
et  al., 2006). A wide variety of activities fall under the heading of 
expert judgment that includes blue ribbon panels, Delphi surveys, and 
decision conferencing.
Elements
Structured expert judgment such as science-based uncertainty quan-
tification was pioneered in the Rasmussen Report on risks of nuclear 
power plants (Rasmussen, 1975). The methodology was further elabo-
rated in successive studies and involves protocols for expert selection 
and training, elicitation procedures and performance-based combi-
nations that are described in more detail in Goossens et  al. (2000). 
In large studies, multiple expert panels provide inputs to computer 
models with no practical alternative for combining expert judg-
ments except to use equal weighting. Hora (2004) has shown that 
equal weight combinations of statistically accurate (‘well calibrated’) 
experts loses statistical accuracy. Combinations based on experts’ 
statistical accuracy have consistently given more accurate and infor-
mative results (see for example Cooke and Goossens, 2008; Aspinall, 
2010).
How can this tool improve decision making under uncertainty?
Structured expert judgment can provide insights into the nature of 
the uncertainties associated with a specific risk and the importance of 
undertaking more detailed analyses to design meaningful strategies 
and policies for dealing with climate change in the spirit of deliberative 
thinking. In addition to climate change (Morgan and Keith, 1995; Zick-
feld et al., 2010), structured expert judgment has migrated into many 
fields such as volcanology (Aspinall, 1996, 2010), dam/dyke  safety 
(Aspinall, 2010), seismicity (Klügel, 2008), civil aviation (Ale et  al., 
2009), ecology (Martin et  al., 2012; Rothlisberger et  al., 2012), toxi-
cology (Tyshenko et al., 2011), security (Ryan et al., 2012), and epidemi-
ology (Tuomisto et al., 2008).
The general conclusions emerging from experience with structured 
expert judgments to date are: (1) formalizing the expert judgment pro-
cess and adhering to a strict protocol adds substantial value to under-
standing the importance of characterizing uncertainty; (2) experts 
differ greatly in their ability to provide statistically accurate and infor-
mative quantifications of uncertainty; and (3) if expert judgments must 
be combined to support complex decision problems, the combination 
Box 2�2 | Quantifying uncertainty 
Natural language is not adequate for propagating and com-
municating uncertainty. To illustrate, consider the U. S. National 
Research Council 2010 report Advancing the Science of Climate 
Change (America’s Climate Choices: Panel on Advancing the Sci-
ence of Climate Change; National Research Council, 2010). Using 
the AR4 calibrated uncertainty language, the NRC is highly confi-
dent that (1) the Earth is warming and that (2) most of the recent 
warming is due to human activities.
What does the second statement mean? Does it mean the NRC is 
highly confident that the Earth is warming and the recent warm-
ing is anthropogenic or that, given the Earth is warming, are they 
highly confident humans cause this warming? The latter seems 
most natural, as the warming is asserted in the first statement. In 
that case the ‘high confidence’ applies to a conditional statement. 
The probability of both statements being true is the probability 
of the condition (Earth is warming) multiplied by the probability 
of this warming being caused by humans, given that warming is 
taking place. If both statements enjoy high confidence, then in 
the calibrated language of AR4 where high confidence implies a 
probability of 0.8, the statement that both are true would only be 
“more likely than not” (0.8 x 0.8 = 0.64).
Qualitative uncertainty analysis easily leads the unwary to errone-
ous conclusions. Interval analysis is a semi-qualitative method in 
which ranges are assigned to uncertain variables without distribu-
tions and can mask the complexities of propagation, as attested 
by the following statement in an early handbook on risk analysis: 
“The simplest quantitative measure of variability in a parameter or 
a measurable quantity is given by an assessed range of the values 
the parameter or quantity can take. This measure may be adequate 
for certain purposes (e. g., as input to a sensitivity analysis), but in 
general it is not a complete representation of the analyst’s knowl-
edge or state of confidence and generally will lead to an unreal-
istic range of results if such measures are propagated through an 
analysis”, (U. S. NRC, 1983, Chapter 12, p.12).
The sum of 10 independent variables each ranging between 
zero and ten, can assume any value between zero and 100. The 
upper (lower) bound can be attained only if ALL variables take 
their maximal (minimal) values, whereas values near 50 can 
arise through many combinations. Simply stating the interval 
[0, 100] conceals the fact that very high (low) values are much 
more exceptional than central values. These same concepts are 
widely represented throughout the uncertainty analysis literature. 
According to Morgan and Henrion (1990): “Uncertainty analysis 
is the computation of the total uncertainty induced in the out-
put by quantified uncertainty in the inputs and models […] Fail-
ure to engage in systematic sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
leaves both analysts and users unable to judge the adequacy of 
the analysis and the conclusions reached”, (Morgan and Henrion, 
1990, p. 39).
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method should be subjected to the following quality controls: statisti-
cal accuracy and informativeness (Aspinall, 2010).
As attested by a number of governmental guidelines, structured expert 
judgment is increasingly accepted as quality science that is applicable 
when other methods are unavailable (U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2005). Some expert surveys of economists concerned with 
climate change examine damages (Nordhaus, 1994) and appropri-
ate discount rates (Weitzman, 2001). Structured expert judgments of 
climate scientists were recently used to quantify uncertainty in the 
ice sheet contribution to sea level rise, revealing that experts’ uncer-
tainty regarding the 2100 contribution to sea level rise from ice sheets 
increased between 2010 and 2012 (Bamber and Aspinall, 2013).
Damages or benefits to ecosystems from invasions of non-indigenous 
species are difficult to quantify and monetize on the basis of histori-
cal data. However ecologists, biologists and conservation economists 
have substantial knowledge regarding the possible impacts of inva-
sive species. Recent studies applied structured expert judgment with 
a performance-based combination and validation to quantify the costs 
and benefits of the invasive species introduced since 1959 into the U. S. 
Great Lakes by opening the St. Lawrence Seaway (Rothlisberger et al., 
2009, 2012). Lessons from studies such as these reveal that experts 
may have applicable knowledge that can be captured in a structured 
elicitation when historical data have large uncertainties associated 
with them.
Advantages and limitations of structured expert judgment 
Expert judgment studies do not reduce uncertainty; they merely quan-
tify it. If the uncertainties are large, as indeed they often are, then deci-
sion makers cannot expect science to relieve them of the burden of 
deciding under conditions of ambiguity. Since its inception, structured 
expert judgment has been met with scepticism in some quarters; it is, 
after all, just opinions and not hard facts. Its steady growth and widen-
ing acceptance over 35 years correlates with the growth of complex 
decision support models. The use of structured expert judgment must 
never justify a diminution of effort in collecting hard data.
2�5�7�2 Scenario analysis and ensembles
Scenario analysis develops a set of possible futures based on extrapo-
lating current trends and varying key parameters, without sampling in 
a systematic manner from an uncertainty distribution. Utilizing suffi-
ciently long time horizons ensures that structural changes in the sys-
tem are considered. The futurist Herman Kahn and colleagues at the 
RAND Corporation are usually credited with inventing scenario analy-
sis (Kahn and Wiener, 1967). In the climate change arena, scenarios are 
currently presented as different emission pathways or Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs). Predicting the effects of such path-
ways involves modelling the Earth’s response to changes in GHG con-
centrations from natural and anthropogenic sources. Different climate 
models will yield different projections for the same emissions scenario. 
Model Intercomparison studies generate sets of projections termed 
‘ensembles’ (van Vuuren et al., 2011).
Elements of the theory
Currently, RCPs are carefully constructed on the bases of plausible 
storylines while insuring (1) they are based on a representative set of 
peer-reviewed scientific publications by independent groups, (2) they 
provide climate and atmospheric models as inputs, (3) they are harmo-
nized to agree on a common base year, and (4) they extend to the year 
2100. The four RCP scenarios, shown in Figure 2.3 relative to the range 
of baseline scenarios in the literature, roughly span the entire scenario 
literature, which includes control scenarios reaching 430 ppm CO2eq 
or lower by 2100. The scenarios underlying the RCPs were originally 
developed by four independent integrated assessment models, each 
with their own carbon cycle. To provide the climate community with 
four harmonized scenarios, they were run through the same carbon 
cycle / climate model (Meinshausen et al., 2011). Note that a represen-
tative set is not a random sample from the scenarios as they do not 
represent independent samples from some underlying uncertainty dis-
tribution over unknown parameters.
Ensembles of model runs generated by different models, called multi-
model ensembles or super-ensembles, convey the scatter of the climate 
response and natural internal climate variability around reference sce-
narios as sampled by a set of models, but cannot be interpreted proba-
bilistically without an assessment of model biases, model interdepen-
dence, and how the ensemble was constructed (see WGI AR5 Section 
12.2; Knutti et  al., 2010). In many cases the assessed uncertainty is 
larger than the raw model spread, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The 
shaded areas (+ / - 1 standard deviation) around the time series do not 
imply that 68 % are certain to fall in the shaded areas, but the model-
ers’ assessed uncertainty (likely ranges, vertical bars on the right) are 
larger. These larger ranges reflect uncertainty in the carbon cycle and 
the full range of climate sensitivity (WGI AR4 Section 10.5.4.6 and Box 
10.3; Knutti et al., 2008) but do not reflect other possible sources of 
uncertainty (e. g., ice sheet dynamics, permafrost, or changes in future 
solar and volcanic forcings). Moreover, many of these models have 
common ancestors and share parameterizations or code (Knutti et al., 
2013) creating dependences between different model runs. Probability 
statements on global surface warming require estimating the models’ 
bias and interdependence (see WGI AR5 Sections 12.2 and 12.4.1.2). 
WGI AR5 assigns likelihood statements (calibrated language) to global 
temperature ranges for the RCP scenarios (WGI AR5 Table SPM.2) but 
does not provide probability density functions (PDFs), as there is no 
established formal method to generate PDFs based on results from dif-
ferent published studies.
Advantages and limitation of scenario and ensemble analyses
Scenario and  ensemble analyses are an essential step in scoping the 
range of effects of human actions and climate change. If the scenarios 
span the range of possible outcomes, they may be seen as providing 
support for uncertainty distributions in a formal uncertainty analysis. If 
specific assumptions are imposed when generating the scenarios, then 
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Figure 2�3 | Total radiative forcing (left panel) and cumulative carbon emissions since 1751 (right panel) in baseline scenario literature compared to RCP scenarios. Forcing was estimated 
ex-post from models with full coverage using the median output from the MAGICC results. Secondary axis in the left panel expresses forcing in CO2eq concentrations. Scenarios are depicted 


















































































Figure 2�4 | Solid lines are multi-model global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980 – 1999) for the scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown as continuations of the 20th century 
simulations. Shading denotes the ± 1 standard deviation range of individual model annual averages. The orange line is for the experiment where concentrations were held constant 
at year 2000 values. The grey bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six families of emissions scenarios discussed 
in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). The assessment of the best estimate and likely ranges in the grey bars includes the Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models 
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the support is conditional on these assumptions (see Section 6.2.3). 
The advantage of scenario / ensemble analyses is that they can be per-
formed without quantifying the uncertainty of the underlying unknown 
parameters. On the downside, it is easy to read more into these analy-
ses than is justified. Analysts often forget that scenarios are illustra-
tive possible futures along a continuum. They tend to use one of those 
scenarios in a deterministic fashion without recognizing that they have 
a low probability of occurrence and are only one of many possible out-
comes. The use of probabilistic language in describing the swaths of 
scenarios (such as standard deviations in Figure 2.4) may also encour-
age the misunderstandings that these represent science-based ranges 
of confidence.
The study of representative scenarios based on probabilistic fore-
casts have been shown to facilitate strategic planning by professional 
groups such as military commanders, oil company managers, and poli-
cymakers (Schoemaker, 1995; Bradfield et al., 2005). Recent work on 
ice sheet modelling (Little et al., 2013) points in this direction. Using 
modelling assumptions and prior distributions on model coefficients, 
Monte Carlo simulations are used to produce probabilistic predictions. 
Expert informed modelling is methodologically intermediate between 
structured expert judgment (Bamber and Aspinall, 2013) and non-
probabilistic scenario sweeps. Structured expert judgment leaves the 
modelling assumptions to the experts who quantify their uncertainty 
on future observables.
2.6 Managing  uncertainty, 
risk and learning
2�6�1 Guidelines for developing policies
This section assesses how the risks and uncertainties associated with 
climate change can affect choices with respect to policy responses, 
strategies, and instruments. At the time of the AR4, there was some 
modelling-based literature on how uncertainties affected policy design, 
but very few empirical studies. In the intervening years, international 
negotiations failed to establish clear national emissions reductions 
targets, but established a set of normative principles, such as limit-
ing global warming to 2 °C. These are now reflected in international, 
national, and subnational planning processes and have affected the 
risks and uncertainties that matter for new climate policy develop-
ment. Greater attention and effort has been given to finding syner-
gies between climate policy and other policy objectives, so that it is 
now important to consider multiple benefits of a single policy instru-
ment. For example, efforts to protect tropical rainforests (McDermott 
et  al., 2011), rural livelihoods (Lawlor et  al., 2010), biodiversity (Jin-
nah, 2011), public health (Stevenson, 2010), fisheries (Axelrod, 2011), 
arable land (Conliffe, 2011), energy security (Battaglini et  al., 2009), 
and job creation (Barry et al., 2008) have been framed as issues that 
should be considered when evaluating climate policies.
The treatment here complements the examination of policies and 
instruments in later chapters of this report, such as Chapter 6 (which 
assesses the results of IAMs) and Chapters 13 – 15 (which assess policy 
instruments at a range of scales). Those later chapters provide greater 
details on the overall tradeoffs to be made in designing policies. The 
focus here is on the special effects of various uncertainties and risks on 
those tradeoffs. 
•	 Section 2.6.2 discusses how institutions that link science with pol-
icy grapple with several different forms of uncertainty so that they 
meet both scientific and political standards of accountability.
•	 Section 2.6.3 presents the results of integrated assessment models 
(IAMs) that address the choice of a climate change temperature 
target or the optimal transition pathway to achieve a particular 
target. IAMs normally focus on a social planner operating at the 
global level.
•	 Section 2.6.4 summarizes the findings from modelling and empiri-
cal studies that examine the processes and architecture of interna-
tional treaties.
•	 Section 2.6.5 presents the results of modelling studies and the 
few empirical analyses that examine the choice of particular policy 
instruments at the sovereign state level for reducing GHG emis-
sions. It also examines how the adoption of energy efficiency prod-
ucts and technologies can be promoted at the firm and household 
levels. Special attention is given to how uncertainties affect the 
performance and effectiveness of these policy instruments.
•	 Section 2.6.6 discusses empirical studies of people’s support or 
opposition with respect to changes in investment patterns and 
livelihood or lifestyles that climate policies will bring about. These 
studies show people’s sensitivity to the impact that climate change 
will have on their personal health or safety and their perceptions 
of the health and safety risks associated with the new technolo-
gies addressing the climate change problem. 
Linking intuitive thinking and deliberative thinking processes for deal-
ing with uncertainties associated with climate change and climate 
policy should increase the likelihood that instruments and robust poli-
cies will be implemented. In this sense, the concepts presented in this 
section should be viewed as a starting point for integrating descriptive 
models with normative models of choice for developing risk manage-
ment strategies.
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2�6�2 Uncertainty and the science/policy 
 interface 
Science/policy interfaces are defined as social processes which encom-
pass relationships between scientists and other actors in the policy 
process, and which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, and joint con-
struction of knowledge with the aim of enriching decision making (Van 
den Hove, 2007). Analysts have called attention to several different 
forms of uncertainty affecting the science/policy relationship that can 
be summarized as follows:
•	 Paradigmatic uncertainty results from the absence of prior agree-
ment on the framing of problems, on methods for scientifically 
investigating them, and on how to combine knowledge from 
disparate research traditions. Such uncertainties are especially 
common in cross-disciplinary, application-oriented research and 
assessment for meeting policy objectives (Gibbons, 1994; Nowotny 
et al., 2001).
•	 Epistemic uncertainty results from lack of information or knowl-
edge for characterizing phenomena. Stirling (2007) further dis-
tinguishes between uncertainty (insufficient knowledge to assess 
probabilities), ambiguity (insufficient knowledge about possible 
outcomes), and ignorance (insufficient knowledge of likely out-
comes and their probabilities). Others have noted that producing 
more knowledge may exacerbate uncertainty, especially when 
actors disagree about how to frame a problem for scientific inves-
tigation (Beck, 1992; Gross, 2010).
•	 Translational uncertainty results from scientific findings that are 
incomplete or conflicting, so that they can be invoked to support 
divergent policy positions (Sarewitz, 2010). In such circumstances, 
protracted controversy often occurs, as each side challenges the 
methodological foundations of the other’s claims in a process 
called ‘experimenters’ regress’ (Collins, 1985).
Institutions that link science to policy must grapple with all of the 
above forms of uncertainty, often simultaneously. Because their 
work cuts across conventional lines between science and politics, 
these institutions have been called ‘boundary organizations’ (Gus-
ton, 2001) and their function has been termed ‘hybrid management’ 
(Miller, 2001). Straddling multiple worlds, science-policy institutions 
are required to meet both scientific and political standards of account-
ability. Whereas achieving scientific consensus frequently calls for 
bounding and closing down disagreements, achieving political legiti-
macy requires opening up areas of conflict in order to give voice to 
divergent perspectives.
The task of resolving conflicts in policy-relevant science is generally 
entrusted to multidisciplinary expert bodies. These organizations are 
best suited to addressing the paradigmatic uncertainties that arise 
when problems are novel or when synthesis is required across fields 
with different standards of good scientific practice. Bridging epistemic 
and translational uncertainties, however, imposes added demands. For 
expert advisory bodies to be viewed as legitimate they must represent 
all relevant viewpoints in a politically acceptable manner (Jasanoff, 
1990; 2005a). What counts as acceptable varies to some degree across 
national decision-making cultures. Each culture may place different 
weights on experts’ personal integrity, the reliability of their disciplin-
ary judgments, and their ability to forge agreement across competing 
values (Jasanoff, 2005b, pp. 209 – 224).
To achieve legitimacy, institutions charged with linking science to policy 
must also open themselves up to public input at one or more stages in 
their deliberations. This process of “extended peer review” (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1992) is regarded as necessary, though insufficient, for the 
production of “socially robust knowledge”, that is, knowledge that can 
withstand public scrutiny and scepticism (Gibbons, 1994). Procedures 
that are sufficient to produce public trust in one political context may 
not work in others because national political cultures are character-
ized by different “civic epistemologies”, i. e., culturally specific modes 
of generating and publicly testing policy-relevant knowledge (Jasanoff, 
2005a).
International and global scientific assessment bodies confront addi-
tional problems of legitimacy because they operate outside long-
established national decision-making cultures and are accountable to 
publics subscribing to different civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2010). 
The temptation for such bodies has been to seek refuge in the linear 
model in the hope that the strength of their internal scientific consen-
sus will be sufficient to win wide political buy-in. The recent research 
on linking science to policy suggests otherwise.
2�6�3 Optimal or efficient stabilization 
pathways (social planner 
perspective) 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) vary widely in their underly-
ing structure and decision-making processes. IAMs designed for 
cost-benefit analysis typically simulate the choices of an idealized 
‘social planner’, who by definition is someone who makes decisions 
on behalf of society, in order to achieve the highest social welfare by 
weighting the benefits and cost of mitigation measures. In contrast, 
many IAMs designed for cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) specify the 
social planner’s objective as identifying the transformation pathway 
that achieves a pre-defined climate goal at the lowest discounted 
aggregated costs to society. In both cases, the analyses do not con-
sider distributional effects of policies on different income groups, but 
instead focus on the effect on total macroeconomic costs. Hence, 
with these types of IAMs, negotiators that are part of the political 
process are able to rank the relative desirability of alternative poli-
cies to the extent that they share the definition of social welfare 
embedded in the model (e. g., discounted aggregate cost minimi-
zation), and believe that those implementing the policy will do so 
cooperatively.
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Chapter 6 describes in more detail important structural characteristics 
of a set of IAMs used to generate transformation pathways. The mod-
elling analyses highlighted in Chapter 6 utilize the scenario approach 
to represent uncertainty. In this section we instead focus on IAM 
results where uncertainty is an integral part of the decision-analytic 
framework.
Climate policy assessment should be considered in the light of uncer-
tainties associated with climate or damage response functions, the 
costs of mitigation technology and the uncertainty in climate change 
policy instruments. A key question these analyses address is how 
uncertainty with respect to the above factors alters the optimal social 
planner’s short-term reactions to climate change. A subset also asks 
whether adjusting behaviour to uncertainty and designing more flex-
ible policies and technology solutions would induce a significant wel-
fare gain. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the existing literature on IAMs that 
examine mitigation actions. The rows classify the literature on the 
basis of the type of uncertainty: upstream, associated with emission 
baseline drivers, such as economic and population growth; down-
stream continuous, associated with climate feedbacks and damages; 
downstream strongly nonlinear, associated with the possibility of 
thresholds and irreversibilities; policy responses, associated with the 
uncertain adoption of policy tools; and multiple sources, when more 
than one of the sources above are considered simultaneously. The 
three columns categorize the literature according to the ways intro-
ducing uncertainty influence the findings. The theoretical economic 
literature shows that the effect of including uncertainty in decision 
making on near-term mitigation is ambiguous (for an overview see 
e. g., Lange and Treich, 2008; De Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012). However, 
for most studies that assume downstream strongly nonlinear uncer-
tainties under a social welfare maximization or downstream uncer-
tainties in combination with a temperature target, including uncer-
tainty in the analysis leads to an optimal or efficient level of 
mitigation that is greater and / or accelerated than under conditions of 
certainty.
The literature on IAMs incorporating uncertainty uses either Monte 
Carlo simulations or fully stochastic programming techniques. Monte 
Carlo studies provide insights regarding the order-of-magnitude effect 
of multiple model parameter uncertainties for model output (Nordhaus 
and Popp, 1997; Tol, 1999; Webster et  al., 2002; Hope, 2008, p.  200; 
Ackerman et al., 2010; Dietz, 2011; Pycroft et al., 2011). In this sense 
they can be interpreted as a preparatory step towards a full-fledged 
decision analysis under uncertainty.
Table 2�2 | Overview of literature on integrated assessment models examining mitigation actions. (cea) indicates: analysis based on a probabilistic generalization of CEA. Papers 
that appear several times report different scenarios or assumptions. The few studies highlighted by “*” use non-probabilistic decision criteria under uncertainty (e. g., minimax regret 
or maximin). 1
Type of Uncertainty Considered
Effect on Mitigation Action
Accelerates / Increases Mitigation Action Delays/Decreases Mitigation Action Ambiguous Effect
Upstream (emission drivers) Reilly et al., 1987; Webster et al., 2002; O’Neill 
and Sanderson, 2008; Rozenberg et al., 2010
O’Neill and Sanderson, 2008
Downstream (climate 
and damages) — mildly 
nonlinear damages
Chichilnisky and Heal, 1993; Peck and Teisberg, 1994; 
Ha-Duong and Treich, 2004; Syri et al., 2008; Athanassoglou 
and Xepapadeas, 2011; Kaufman, 2012; Ackerman et al., 2013
Kolstad, 1994, 1996a; Baranzini et al., 2003 Clarke and Reed, 1994; Kolstad, 1996b; 
Tsur and Zemel, 1996; Gollier et al., 2000; 
Fisher and Narain, 2003; Ha-Duong and 
Treich, 2004; Baker et al., 2006; Lange and 
Treich, 2008; Lorenz et al., 2012b; Ulph 
and Ulph, 1997; Ackerman et al., 2013
Downstream (climate and 
damages) — strongly nonlinear 
event or temperature target
Ha-Duong, 1998; Gjerde et al., 1999; O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 
2002; Baranzini et al., 2003; Dumas and Ha-Duong, 2005; 
Syri et al., 2008(cea); Johansson et al., 2008(cea); Hope, 
2008; Webster, 2008; Tsur and Zemel, 2009; Schmidt et al., 
2011(cea); Funke and Paetz, 2011; Iverson and Perrings, 
2012*; Lorenz et al., 2012b; de Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012
Peck and Teisberg, 1995 Gollier and Treich, 2003
Uncertainty on Policy Response Ha-Duong et al., 1997; Blanford, 2009; Bosetti and Tavoni, 
2009; Bosetti et al., 2009; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2010(cea)
Baudry, 2000; Baker and Shittu, 2006(cea)2 Farzin and Kort, 2000(cea)
Multiple Sources of Uncertainty Nordhaus and Popp, 1997; Grubb, 1997; Pizer, 1999; Tol, 
1999; Obersteiner et al., 2001; Yohe et al., 2004; Keller et al., 
2004; Baker and Shittu, 2008; Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 2008; 
Bahn et al., 2008; Held et al., 2009; Hope, 2009; Labriet et al., 
2012(cea), 2010; Hof et al., 2010* ; Funke and Paetz, 2011* 
Scott et al., 1999 Manne and Richels, 1991; Baker and Shittu, 
2008(4); Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 20083
Notes:
1 In some studies the ‘baseline case’ is a decision analysis based on a reduced form of uncertainty.
2 The impact on R&D investments depend on technology; the most common result is, however, that uncertainty decreases the optimal level of R&D investments.
3 In the sense of: increasing damage uncertainty would lead to higher investments in less risky programmes, but the effect depends on the type of technology.
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Table 2.2 also characterizes the effect of the inclusion of uncertainty 
on early-period mitigation efforts. A decision analysis is generally com-
pared to a baseline-case represented by a deterministic study utilizing 
average values of uncertain parameters. (In some studies, the baseline 
case is a decision analysis based on a reduced form of uncertainty.)
It should be noted that, although IAMs mimic decision makers who 
utilize deliberative processes, in reality social planners might resort to 
intuitive thinking to simplify their decision processes, leading to biases 
and inferior choices. To date there is no research that considers such 
behaviour by decision makers and how it affects the projections of 
IAMs. We discuss the need for such studies in Section 2.7 on gaps in 
knowledge and data.
2�6�3�1 Analyses predominantly addressing climate or 
damage response uncertainty
Although studies differ in their approaches, the case against acceler-
ated or increased mitigation action is the possibility that irreversible 
sunk cost investments in abatement options outweigh the irreversible 
effects of climate change. This has been an infrequent finding, with the 
exception of those studies that have not included catastrophic / thresh-
old damage and give no consideration to the non-climate related 
benefits of these investments, such as enhancing energy security or 
local pollution benefits. Indeed, the one set of papers that finds a need 
for increased or accelerated mitigation action is ambiguous when 
the social welfare optimum is examined under downstream continu-
ous / mildly nonlinear damages uncertainty. Lorenz et al. (2012a) show 
that this is due primarily to the fact that damage nonlinearities are 
often compensated by other nonlinearities such as a concave (i. e., sub-
linear) concentration-temperature relation.
Studies that cluster in the first column (accelerated or increased 
mitigation action) assumed strongly non-linear damage functions or 
temperature targets (3rd row). Cost-effectiveness analysis has been 
applied to reflect targets when the models have been generalized to 
include uncertainty. In this regard, Held et al. (2009), utilizing chance 
constrained programming (CCP) (see Section 2.5.4.1), examine uncer-
tainty in climate and technology response properties. As their reference 
case they calculated the mitigation effort needed to achieve a 2 °C 
temperature target, assuming average values for all uncertain param-
eters. Given uncertainty, however, it is clear that any given mitigation 
effort will exceed the target with some probability; for the reference 
case this is approximately 50 %. As the required probability for meet-
ing the target increases, a greater level of mitigation effort is required. 
(An analogous argument holds for tipping-point derived targets. See 
McInerney and Keller, 2008). If the required probability is 66.6 % rather 
than 50 %, investments in mitigation technologies need to occur in 
earlier decades.
The effects on investment in mitigation also depend on whether uncer-
tainty is expected to be reduced. Is a reduction of uncertainty on cli-
mate sensitivity and related climate response properties realistic? In 
an early paper, Kelly and Kolstad (1999) evaluated the amount of time 
needed to significantly reduce uncertainty about the parameters influ-
encing climate sensitivity by observing global warming. They found the 
required time to be 90 to 160 years. Leach (2007) conducted a simi-
lar analysis that allowed two rather than one independent sources of 
downstream uncertainty. In that case, the time required to resolve the 
climate sensitivity parameters is likely to be even longer. These kind of 
studies assumed that our basic understanding of atmospheric chem-
istry and physics would remain unchanged over time. If one were to 
relax this constraint, then one could imagine that learning would prog-
ress more rapidly.
Another set of papers examines the ‘anticipation effect’, namely what 
it means if we believe we will learn in the future, rather than that our 
knowledge will remain constant. Lange and Treich (2008) showed that 
the sign and magnitude of mitigation depend on the particular numeri-
cal model and type of uncertainty when introducing the anticipation 
effect. Using CBA, for example, Lorenz et al. (2012b), Peck and Teisberg 
(1993), Webster et  al. (2008), and Yohe and Wallace (1996) showed 
the anticipation effect to be negligible when assuming continuous and 
only weakly non-linear damages. However, Lorenz (2012b) showed 
slightly less immediate mitigation (compared to no-learning) if one 
anticipates learning within a given, narrow, time window with respect 
to threshold-type impacts. Such a mild reduction of early mitigation 
in response to anticipation was also reported in Keller et al. (2004) in 
accordance with Ulph and Ulph (1997).
When CEA is used to represent temperature targets in combination 
with climate response uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate learning 
effects (see the discussion in Section 2.5.4.3). One way to allow for 
numerical solutions in this case is to assume an upper limit on the dis-
tribution of climate sensitivity to examine the effect of learning in the 
presence of a climate target. Under this assumption, more mitigation is 
called for (Bahn et al., 2008; Syri et al., 2008; Fouquet and Johansson, 
2008; Webster, 2008).
A further set of papers considers the impossibility of specifying a pre-
cise probability density function for characterizing climate sensitivity 
as suggested by many climate scientists. This implies that these prob-
abilities are difficult to estimate and decisions have to be made under 
conditions of ambiguity. Funke and Paetz (2011) account for model 
structure uncertainty by employing a robust control approach based 
on a maximin principle. When considering uncertainty on the ecologi-
cal side of the balance, they conclude that model uncertainty implies 
a need for more aggressive near-term emissions reductions. Athanas-
soglou and Xepapadeas (2011) extend this approach to include adap-
tation. Iverson and Perrings (2012) apply combinations of maximin 
and / or minimax decision criteria, examining the effects of widening 
the range of climate sensitivity. Hof et al. (2010), contrast a CBA with 
a minimax regret approach and find that the minimax regret approach 
leads to more stringent and robust climate targets for relatively 
low discount rates if both high climate sensitivity and high damage 
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estimates are assumed. What remains unresearched is the possibil-
ity of using non-probabilistic methods to evaluate the effects of an 
unbounded, or ‘fat-tails’, distribution for climate responses and cli-
mate impacts.
Finally, a potentially path-breaking development in economics is the 
effort of Ackerman et al. (2013), Crost and Traeger (2013), and Kaufman 
(2012) to disentangle risk aversion (a static effect) from consumption 
smoothing (an intertemporal effect) (for a conceptual discussion see 
Ha-Duong and Treich, 2004) in an Integrated Assessment Model. Com-
pared to the results of a standard discounted expected utility model 
that relates risk aversion to consumption smoothing, Ackerman (2013) 
as well as Crost and Traeger (2013) find optimal mitigation to be twice 
as great. Since these are the first papers on this topic, it is too early to 
tell whether their results represent a robust result that captures soci-
ety’s risk preferences.
2�6�3�2 Analyses predominantly addressing policy 
response uncertainty
There are two strands of research in the area of policy response uncer-
tainty. The first has focused on examining how the extent and timing of 
mitigation investments are affected by the uncertainty on the effective-
ness of Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) and / or the 
future cost of technologies for reducing the impact of climate change. 
An example of this would be optimal investment in energy technolo-
gies that a social planner should undertake, knowing that there might 
be a nuclear power ban in the near future. Another strand of research 
looks at how uncertainty concerning future climate policy instruments 
in combination with climate and / or damage uncertainty affects a miti-
gation strategy. An example would be the optimal technological mix in 
the power sector to hedge future climate regulatory uncertainty.
With respect to the first strand, the main challenge is to quantify 
uncertainty related to the future costs and / or availability of mitigation 
technologies. Indeed, there does not appear to be a single stochastic 
process that underlies all (RD&D) programmes’ effectiveness or inno-
vation processes. Thus elicitation of expert judgment on the probabi-
listic improvements in technology performance and cost becomes a 
crucial input for numerical analysis. A literature is emerging that uses 
expert elicitation to investigate the uncertain effects of RD&D invest-
ments on the prospect of success of mitigation technologies (see for 
example Baker et al., 2008; Curtright et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2010; 
Baker and Keisler, 2011). In future years, this new body of research 
will allow the emergence of a literature studying the probabilistic 
relationship between R&D and the future cost of energy technologies 
in IAMs.
The few existing papers reported in Table 2.2 under the Policy Response 
uncertainty column (see Blanford, 2009; Bosetti and Tavoni, 2009) 
point to increased investments in energy RD&D and in early deploy-
ment of carbon-free energy technologies in response to uncertainty. 
An interesting analysis has been performed in Goeschl and Perino 
(2009), where the potential for technological ‘boomerangs’ is consid-
ered. Indeed, while studies cited above consider an innovation failure 
an R&D project that does not deliver a clean technology at a competi-
tive cost, Goeschl and Perino (2009) define R&D failure when it brings 
about a new, environmentally harmful, technology. Under such char-
acterization they find that short-term R&D investments are negatively 
affected.
Turning to the second strand of literature reported in the Policy 
Response or in the Multiple Uncertainty columns of Table 2.2 (see Ha-
Duong et  al., 1997; Baker and Shittu, 2006; Durand-Lasserve et  al., 
2010), most analyses imply increased mitigation in the short term 
when there is uncertainty about future climate policy due to the asym-
metry of future states of nature. In the event of the realization of the 
‘no climate policy’ state, investment in carbon-free capital has low or 
zero value. Conversely, if a ‘stringent climate policy’ state of nature is 
realized, it will be necessary to rapidly ramp up mitigation to reduce 
the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. This cost is consistently 
higher, thus implying higher mitigation prior to the realization of the 
uncertain policy state.
2�6�4 International negotiations and 
 agreements
Social planner studies, as reviewed in the previous sub-sections, con-
sider the appropriate magnitude and pace of aggregate global emis-
sions reduction. These issues have been the subject of negotiations 
about long-term strategic issues at the international level along with 
the structuring of national commitments and the design of mecha-
nisms for compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.
2�6�4�1 Treaty formation
A vast literature looks at international treaties in general and how they 
might be affected by uncertainties. Cooper (1989) examined two cen-
turies of international agreements that aimed to control the spread of 
communicable diseases and concludes that it is only when uncertainty 
is largely resolved that countries will enter into agreements. Young 
(1994), on the other hand, suggests that it may be easier to enter into 
agreements when parties are uncertain over their individual net bene-
fits from an agreement than when that uncertainty has been resolved. 
Coalition theory predicts that for international negotiations related to 
a global externality such as climate change, stable coalitions will gen-
erally be small and / or ineffective (Barrett, 1994). Recently, De Canio 
and Fremstad (2013) show how the recognition of the seriousness of 
a climate catastrophe on the part of leading governments — which 
increases the incentives for reaching an agreement — could transform 
a prisoner’s dilemma game into a coordination game leading to an 
increased likelihood of reaching an international agreement to limit 
emissions.
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Relatively little research has been undertaken on how uncertainty 
affects the stability of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
and when uncertainty and learning has the potential to unravel agree-
ments. Kolstad (2007), using a game theoretic model, looks specifically 
at environmental agreements. He finds that systematic uncertainty 
decreases the size of the largest stable coalition of an MEA. Kolstad 
and Ulph (2011) show that partial or complete learning has a nega-
tive impact on the formation of an MEA because as outcomes become 
more certain, some countries also learn the MEA will reduce their own 
welfare benefits, which deters them from joining the coalition. Baker 
(2005), using a model of the impacts of uncertainty and learning in a 
non-cooperative game, shows that the level of correlation of damages 
across countries is a crucial determinant of outcome.
Barrett (2013) has investigated the role of catastrophic, low probabil-
ity events on the likelihood of cooperation with respect to a global 
climate agreement. By comparing a cooperative agreement with the 
Nash equilibrium it is possible to assess a country’s incentives for par-
ticipating in such an agreement. Looking at stratospheric ozone as an 
analogy for climate, Heal and Kunreuther (2013) observed that the 
signing of the Montreal Protocol by the United States led many other 
countries to follow suit. The authors in turn suggest how it could be 
applied to foster an international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions 
by tipping a non-cooperative game from an inefficient to an efficient 
equilibrium.
Several analyses, including Victor (2011) and Hafner-Burton et  al. 
(2012), contend that the likelihood of a successful comprehensive 
international agreement for climate change is low because of the sen-
sitivity of negotiations to uncertain factors, such as the precise align-
ment and actions of participants. Keohane and Victor (2011), in turn, 
suggest that the chances of a positive outcome would be higher in 
the case of numerous, more limited agreements. Developing countries 
have been unlikely to agree to binding targets in the context of inter-
national agreements due in part to the interests of developed coun-
tries dominating the negotiation process. For the situation to change, 
the developing countries would have to enhance their negotiating 
power in international climate change discussions by highlighting their 
concerns (Rayner and Malone, 2001).
The above analyses all assume that the agents are deliberative think-
ers, each of whom has the same information on the likelihood and con-
sequences of climate change. Section 2.7 indicates the need for future 
research that examines the impact of intuitive thinking on behaviour 
on international negotiations and processes for improving the chances 
of reaching an agreement on treaties.
2�6�4�2 Strength and form of national commitments
Buys et al. (2009) construct a model to predict national level support 
for a strong global treaty based on both the climatic and economic 
risks that parties to the treaty face domestically; however Buys et al. 
do not test the model empirically. Their model distinguishes between 
vulnerabilities to climate impacts and climate policy restrictions with 
respect to carbon emissions and implies that countries would be most 
supportive of strong national commitments when they are highly vul-
nerable to climate impacts and their emitting sectors are not greatly 
affected by stringent policy measures.
Victor (2011) analyzes the structure of the commitments themselves, 
or what Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) call rational design choices. Victor 
suggests that while policymakers have considerable control over the 
carbon intensity of their economies, they have much less control over 
the underlying economic growth of their country. As a result, there is 
greater uncertainty on the magnitude of emissions reductions, which 
depends on both factors, than on the reductions in carbon intensity. 
Victor suggests that this could account for the reluctance by many 
countries to make binding commitments with respect to emissions 
reductions. Consistent with this reasoning, Thompson (2010) examined 
negotiations within the UNFCCC and found that greater uncertainty 
with respect to national emissions was associated with a decrease in 
support for a national commitment to a global treaty.
Webster et  al. (2010) examined whether uncertainty with respect to 
national emissions increases the potential for individual countries to 
hedge by joining an international trade agreement. They found that 
hedging had a minor impact compared to the other effects of interna-
tional trade, namely burden sharing and wealth transfer. These find-
ings may have relevance for structuring a carbon market to reduce 
emissions by taking advantage of disparities in marginal abatement 
costs across different countries. In theory, the right to trade emission 
permits or credits could lessen the uncertainties associated with any 
given country’s compliance costs compared to the case where no trad-
ing were possible. Under a trading scheme, if a country discovered its 
own compliance costs to be exceptionally high, for example, it could 
purchase credits on the market.
2�6�4�3 Design of measurement, verification regimes, 
and treaty compliance
A particularly important issue in climate treaty formation and com-
pliance is uncertainty with respect to actual emissions from industry 
and land use. Measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) regimes 
have the potential to set incentives for participation in a treaty and 
still be stringent, robust, and credible with respect to compliance. 
The effects of strategies for managing GHG emissions are uncertain 
because the magnitude of the emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
GHG gases, such as methane, often cannot be detected given the 
error bounds associated with the measurement process. This is espe-
cially the case in the agriculture, forestry, and other land-use (AFOLU) 
 sectors.
In the near term, an MRV regime that met the highest standards 
could require stock and flow data for carbon and other GHGs. These 
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data are currently available only in wealthy countries, thus preclud-
ing developing countries from participating (Oliveira et al., 2007). By 
contrast, there are design options for MRV regimes that are less accu-
rate, but which still provide data on the drivers of emissions so that 
the developing countries could be part of the system. By being more 
inclusive, these options could be a more effective way to actually 
reduce aggregate emissions, at least in the near term (Bucki et al., 
2012). In the longer term, robust and harmonized estimation of GHG 
flows — emissions and their removal — in agriculture and forestry 
requires investment in monitoring and reporting capacity, especially 
in developing countries (Böttcher et al., 2009; Romijn et al., 2012). 
Reflecting this need for an evolving MRV regime to match data avail-
ability, the 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Invento-
ries, prepared by an IPCC working group, suggested three hierarchi-
cal tiers of data for emission and carbon stock change factors with 
increasing levels of data requirements and analytical complexity. Tier 
1 uses IPCC default values of high uncertainty; Tier 2 uses country-
specific data; and Tier 3 uses higher spatial resolution, models, and 
inventories. In 2008, only  Brazil,  India and Mexico had the capacity 
to use Tier 2 and no developing country was able to use tier 3 (Hard-
castle and Baird, 2008). Romijn et al. (2012) focused on 52 tropical 
countries and found that four of them had a very small capacity gap 
regarding the monitoring of their forests through inventories, while 
the remaining 48 had limited or no ability to undertake this monitor-
ing process.
In order to overcome the gaps and uncertainties associated with 
lower tier approaches, different principles can be applied to form 
pools (Böttcher et al., 2008). For example, a higher level of aggrega-
tion by including soil, litter and harvested products in addition to a 
biomass pool as part of the MRV regime decreases relative uncer-
tainty: the losses in one pool (e. g., biomass) are likely to be offset by 
gains in other pools (e. g., harvested products) (Böttcher et al., 2008). 
Researchers have suggested that the exclusion of a pool (e. g., soil) 
in an MRV regime should be allowed only if there is adequate docu-
mentation that the exclusion provides a more conservative estimate of 
emissions (Grassi et al., 2008). They also suggest that an international 
framework needs to create incentives for investments. In this respect, 
overcoming initialization costs and unequal access to monitoring 
technologies would be crucial for implementation of an integrated 
monitoring system, and fostering international cooperation (Böttcher 
et al., 2009).
2�6�5 Choice and design of policy 
instruments
Whether motivated primarily by a binding multilateral climate treaty 
or by some other set of factors, there is a growing set of policy instru-
ments that countries have implemented or are considering to deal with 
climate change. Typically, these instruments will influence the deci-
sions of firms and private individuals, so that policymakers try to antici-
pate how these agents will react to them.
Some policy instruments operate by mandating particular kinds of 
behaviour, such as the installation of pollution control technology or 
limits on emissions from particular sources. There is an extensive litera-
ture in political science demonstrating that the effects of these instru-
ments are fairly predictable (Shapiro and McGarity, 1991) and are 
insensitive to market or regulatory uncertainties, simply because they 
prescribe particular technologies or practices which must be strictly 
adhered to. There is a literature in economics, however, suggesting that 
their very inflexibility makes them inefficient (Malueg, 1990; Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1995).
In the presence of substantial technological uncertainty, no matter 
what policy instrument is employed, interventions that shift invest-
ment behaviour from currently low cost to currently high cost tech-
nologies run the risk of increasing short-term costs and energy security 
concerns for consumers (Del Rio and Gual, 2007; Frondel et al., 2008, 
2010). In some cases, long-term costs may be higher or lower, depend-
ing on how different technologies evolve over time (Williges et  al., 
2010; Reichenbach and Requate, 2012). This section is structured by 
considering two broad classes of interventions for targeting the energy 
supply: interventions that focus on emissions, by placing a market price 
or tax on CO2 or other greenhouse gases; and interventions that pro-
mote Research, Development, Deployment, and Diffusion (RDD&D) of 
particular technologies. In both types of interventions, policy choices 
can be sensitive to uncertainties in technology costs, markets, and the 
state of regulation in other jurisdictions and over time. In the case 
of technology-oriented policy, choices are also sensitive to the risks 
that particular technologies present. We then describe instruments for 
reducing energy demand by focusing on lifestyle choice and energy 
efficient products and technologies. Finally, we briefly contrast the 
effects of uncertainties in the realm of climate change adaptation with 
climate change mitigation, recognizing that more detail on adaptation 
can be found in the WGII AR5.
2�6�5�1 Instruments creating market penalties for GHG 
emissions
Market-based instruments increase the cost of energy derived from 
fossil fuels, potentially leading firms involved in the production and 
conversion of energy to invest in low carbon technologies. Consider-
able research prior to AR4 identified the differences between two such 
instruments — carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regimes — with respect 
to uncertainty. Since AR4, research has examined the effects of regula-
tory risk and market uncertainty on one instrument or the other by 
addressing the following question: how is the mitigation investment 
decision affected by uncertainty with respect to whether and to what 
extent a market instrument and well-enforced regulations will be in 
place in the future?
Much of this research has focused on uncertainty with respect to car-
bon prices under a cap-and-trade system. A number of factors influence 
the relationship between the size of the cap and the market price that 
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includes fossil fuel prices, consumer demand for energy, and economic 
growth more generally. Each of these factors can lead to volatility in car-
bon market prices (Alberola et al., 2008; Carraro et al., 2009; Chevallier, 
2009). Vasa and Michaelowa (2011) assessed the impact of policy uncer-
tainty on carbon markets and found that the possibility of easily creating 
and destroying carbon markets leads to extreme short-term rent-seeking 
behaviour and high volatility in market prices. Experience so far with the 
most developed carbon market — the European Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (ETS) — reveals high volatility marked by not-infrequent decreases 
of the price of carbon to very low values (Feng et al., 2011).
Numerous modelling studies have shown that regulatory uncertainty 
reduces the effectiveness of market-based instruments. More specifi-
cally, a current or expected carbon price induces a decrease in invest-
ment into lower carbon infrastructure and hence less technological 
learning, when there is uncertainty as to future market conditions, com-
pared to the case where future conditions are known (Yang et al., 2008; 
Fuss et al., 2009; Oda and Akimoto, 2011). In order to compensate and 
maintain a prescribed level of change in the presence of uncertainty, car-
bon prices would need to be higher. Estimates of the additional macro-
economic costs range from 16 – 37 % (Blyth et  al., 2007) to as much 
as 50 % (Reinelt and Keith, 2007), depending on the particular type of 
investment under consideration. The precise instrument design details 
can affect investment behaviour. Patiño-Echeverri et al. (2007, 2009), for 
example, found that less frequent but larger regulatory policy changes 
had less of a negative interactive effect with uncertainty, while Zhao 
(2003) found a greater impact of uncertainty on the performance of a 
carbon tax than on a cap-and-trade system. Fan et al. (2010) added to 
this analysis by examining the sensitivity of these results to increasing 
risk aversion, under two alternative carbon market designs: one in which 
carbon allowances were auctioned by the government to firms, and a 
second in which existing firms received free allowances due to a grand-
fathering rule.
Under an auctioned system for carbon allowances, increasing risk 
aversion leads to greater investments in low carbon technologies. In 
contrast, under a grandfathered market design, increasing risk aver-
sion combined with uncertainty pushes investment behaviour closer to 
what it would be in the absence of the carbon market: more invest-
ment in coal. The intuition behind this finding is that the grandfathered 
scheme would create a situation of windfall profits (since the freely 
allocated permits have a value to the firms receiving them), and risk-
averse investors would be more influenced by the other, less desirable 
state of the world, the absence of carbon markets. Fan et al., (2012) 
replicated these results using a broader range of technological choices 
than in their earlier paper. Whereas these latter two papers used a 
game-theoretic model, Fuss et al., (2012) employed a real options the-
ory model to arrive at qualitatively the same conclusions.
One option for reducing carbon price volatility is to set a cap or floor 
for that price to stabilize investment expectations (Jacoby and Eller-
man, 2004; Philibert, 2009). Wood and Jotzo (2011) found that setting 
a price floor increased the effectiveness of the carbon price in stimulat-
ing investments in low carbon technologies, given a particular expec-
tation of macroeconomic drivers (e. g., economic growth and fossil fuel 
prices that influence the degree to which a carbon cap is a constraint 
on emissions). Szolgayova et al., (2008), using a real options model to 
examined the value of waiting for information, found the cap stabi-
lized expectations. In the process, the cap lessened the effectiveness 
of an expected carbon price at altering investment behaviour, as many 
investments in low carbon technologies are undertaken only because 
of the possibility of very high carbon prices in the future. In another 
study assuming rational actor behaviour, Burtraw et al. (2010) found 
that a symmetric safety valve that sets both a floor and a ceiling price 
outperforms a single-sided safety valve in terms of both emissions 
reduction and economic efficiency. Murray et al. (2009) suggested that 
a reserve allowance for permits outperforms a simple safety valve in 
this regard.
Empirical research on the influence of uncertainty on carbon market per-
formance has been constrained by the small number of functioning mar-
kets, thus making it difficult to infer the effects of differences in market 
design. The few studies to date suggest that the details of market design 
can influence the perception of uncertainty, and in turn the performance 
of the market. More specifically, investment behaviour into the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has been influenced by uncertainties 
in terms of what types of projects are eligible (Castro and Michaelowa, 
2011), as well as the actual number of Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) that can be acquired from a given project (Richardson, 2008). 
Looking at the European Union’s Emission Trading System (ETS), 
researchers have observed that expected carbon prices do affect invest-
ment behaviour, but primarily for investments with very short amortiza-
tion periods. High uncertainty with respect to the longer-term market 
price of carbon has limited the ETS from having an impact on longer-term 
investments such as R&D or new power plant construction (Hoffmann, 
2007). Blyth and Bunn (2011) found that uncertainty for post-2012 
targets was a major driver of ETS prices, with an effect of suppress-
ing those prices. The literature suggests that prices have not been high 
enough to drive renewable energy investment in the absence of feed-in 
tariffs (Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008). Barbose et al. (2008) examined a 
region — the western United States — where no ETS was functioning but 
many believed that it would, and found that most utilities did consider 
the possibility of carbon prices in the range of USD 4 to USD 22 a ton. At 
the same time, the researchers could not determine whether this projec-
tion of carbon prices would have an actual effect on utilities’ decisions, 
were an actual ETS in place, because they were unable to document the 
analysis underlying the utilities’ investment decisions.
2�6�5�2 Instruments promoting technological RDD&D
Several researchers suggest that future pathways for RDD&D will be 
the determining factor for emissions reductions (Prins and Rayner, 
2007; Lilliestam et al., 2012). Policy instruments can provide an incen-
tive for firms not only to alter their investment portfolio towards low 
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carbon technologies, but also to devote resources towards innovation 
(Baker et al., 2008). Because instruments differ in terms of how they 
influence behaviour, such as whether or not they create an immediate 
incentive or one that accrues over the lifetime of the investment, their 
relative effectiveness can be sensitive to relevant market uncertainties.
The literature reviewed in the previous section reveals that in the pres-
ence of substantial regulatory uncertainty, market-based instruments do 
a poor job of promoting RDD&D. This has given rise to policy proposals 
to supplement a pure-market system with another instrument — such 
as a cap, floor, or escape valve — to reduce price volatility and stabilize 
expectations. By contrast, combining a market-based instrument with 
specific technology support can lead to greater volatility in the carbon 
price, even when there is very little uncertainty about which technolo-
gies will be assisted in the coming years (Blyth et al., 2009).
Several empirical studies with a focus on risk and uncertainty have 
compared the effectiveness of market instruments with other instru-
ments such as feed-in tariffs or renewable quota systems, in stimu-
lating low carbon investments and R&D. Butler and Neuhoff (2008) 
compared the feed-in tariff in Germany with the quota system in the 
United Kingdom, and found the German system outperformed the UK 
system on two dimensions: stimulating overall investment quantity, 
and reducing costs to consumers. The primary driver was the effective-
ness of the feed-in tariff in reducing risks associated with future reve-
nues from the project investment, therefore making it possible to lower 
the cost of project financing. Other researchers replicate this finding 
using other case studies (Mitchell et al., 2006; Fouquet and Johansson, 
2008). Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012) surveyed investors with access 
to a number of markets, and found that they steered their new projects 
to those markets with feed-in tariff systems, as it was more likely than 
other policy instruments to reduce their risks. Lüthi (2010) compared 
policy effectiveness across a number of jurisdictions with feed-in tar-
iffs, and found that above a certain level of return, risk-related factors 
did more to influence investment than return-related factors.
Looking at the early stages in the technology development process, 
Bürer and Wüstenhagen (2009) surveyed ‘green’ tech venture capital-
ists in the United States and Europe using a stated preference approach 
to identify which policy instrument or instruments would reduce the 
perceived risks of investment in a particular technology. They identi-
fied a strong preference in both continents, but particularly Europe, 
for feed-in tariffs over cap-and-trade and renewable quota systems, 
because of the lower risks to return on investment associated with the 
former policy instrument. Moreover, venture capital investors typically 
look for short- to medium-term returns on their investment, for which 
the presence of feed-in tariffs has the greatest positive effect.
Held et al. (2006) identified patterns of success across a wide variety of 
policy instruments to stimulate investment in renewable energy tech-
nologies in Europe. They found that long-term regulatory consistency 
was vital for new technology development. Other studies have shown 
that regulatory inconsistency with respect to subsidy programs — such 
as feed-in tariffs in Spain or tax credits in the United States — can lead to 
temporarily overheated markets, pushing up investment costs and con-
sumer prices, and reducing the pressure for technological development 
(Del Rio and Gual, 2007; Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008; Barradale, 2010).
In contrast to the large literature looking at the overall effects of 
uncertainty, there have only been a few empirical papers documenting 
the particular risks that concern investors the most. Leary and Este-
ban (2009) found regulatory uncertainty — particularly with respect to 
issues of siting — to concern investors in wave- and tide-based energy 
projects. Komendantova et  al. (2012) examined perceptions among 
European investors in solar projects in North Africa, and found con-
cerns about regulatory change and corruption were much greater than 
concerns about terrorism and technology risks. The same researchers 
modelled the sensitivity of required state subsidies for project develop-
ment in response to these risks, and found the subsidies required to 
stimulate a given level of solar investment rose by a factor of three, 
suggesting large benefits from stemming corruption and stabilizing 
regulations (Komendantova et al., 2011). Meijer et al. (2007) examined 
the perceived risks for biogas project developers in the Netherlands, 
and found technological, resource, and political uncertainty to be their 
most important concerns. These studies are useful by documenting 
policymakers’ concerns so they can address these issues in the future. 
Table 2.3 synthesizes the modelling and empirical results on renewable 
quota systems and feed-in tariffs, as well as with results for cap-and-
trade systems from the previous sub-section. The table highlights the 
Table 2�3 | Uncertainties affecting the effectiveness of alternative policy instruments.
Instrument Uncertainty Investor fears
Effect on low carbon 
technology
Allowance trading market
Technological systems Other low carbon technologies will prove more cost-effective Dampened investment
Market behaviour Growth in energy demand will decline Dampened investment
Market behaviour Fossil fuel prices will fall Dampened investment
Regulatory actions Governments will increase the number of allowances Dampened investment
Renewable quotas
Technological systems Other low carbon technologies will prove more cost-effective Dampened investment
Market behaviour Supply for renewable energy will rise faster than the quota Dampened investment
Subsidies and feed-in tariffs Regulatory actions Subsidy for this particulartechnology will decline Overheated market
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effects of three of the classes of uncertainties identified earlier in this 
chapter, namely with respect to technological systems, market behav-
iour, and the future regulatory actions of governments.
2�6�5�3 Energy efficiency and behavioural change
As pointed out in Section 2.6.5.2 and earlier sections, one way to 
mitigate climate risk is to encourage RD&D with respect to provid-
ing energy from renewable sources, such as wind and solar, as well 
as to promote low energy use products. For firms to undertake these 
investments, there needs to be some guarantee that a market for their 
products will exist. Currently consumers are reluctant to adopt energy 
efficient measures, such as compact fluorescent bulbs, energy efficient 
refrigerators, boilers and cooling systems, as well as new technologies 
such as solar installations and wind power. This can be attributed to 
the uncertainties associated with future energy prices and consump-
tion of energy coupled with misperceptions of the products’ benefits 
and an unwillingness to incur the upfront costs of these measures as 
discussed in Section 2.4.3.2.
Gardner and Stern (2008) identified a list of energy efficient measures 
that could reduce North American consumers’ energy consumption by 
almost 30 % but found that individuals were not willing to invest in 
them because they have misconceptions about the measures’ effec-
tiveness. Other studies show that the general public has a poor under-
standing of energy consumption associated with familiar activities 
(Sterman and Sweeney, 2007). A national online survey of 505 partici-
pants by Attari et al. (2010) revealed that most respondents felt that 
measures such as turning off the lights or driving less were much more 
effective as energy efficient improvements than experts’ viewed them 
to be. 
There are both behavioural and economic factors described in Sec-
tion 2.4.3.2 that can explain the reluctance of households to incur 
the upfront costs of these energy efficient measures. Due to a focus 
on short-term horizons, individuals may underestimate the savings in 
energy costs from investing in energy efficient measures. In addition 
they are likely to discount the future hyperbolically so that the upfront 
cost is perceived to be greater than expected discounted reduction 
in energy costs (Dietz et al., 2013; Kunreuther et al., 2013b). Coupled 
with these descriptive models or choices that are triggered by intui-
tive thinking, households may have severe budget constraints that 
discourage them from investing in these energy efficient measures. 
If they intend to move in several years and feel that the investment 
in the energy efficient measure will not be adequately reflected in an 
increase in their property value, then it is inappropriate for them not to 
invest in these measures if they undertake deliberative thinking.
To encourage households to invest in energy efficient measures, mes-
sages that communicate information on energy use and savings from 
undertaking these investments need to be conveyed (Abrahamse et al., 
2005). Recent research has indicated the importance of highlighting 
indirect and direct benefits (e. g., being ‘green’, energy independence, 
saving money) in people’s adoption of energy efficiency measures 
to address the broad range and heterogeneity in people’s goals and 
values that contribute to the subjective utility of different courses of 
action (Jakob, 2006). One also needs to recognize the importance of 
political identity considerations when choosing the nature of these 
messages, as different constituencies have different associations to 
options that mitigate climate change and labels that convey potential 
benefits from adopting energy efficient measures (Hardisty et al., 2010; 
Gromet et al., 2013).
The advent of the ‘smart’ grid in Western countries, with its ‘smart’ 
metering of household energy consumption and the development of 
‘smart’ appliances will make it feasible to provide appliance-specific 
feedback about energy use and energy savings to a significant number 
of consumers within a few years. A field study involving more than 
1,500 households in Linz, Austria revealed that feedback on electric-
ity consumption corresponded with electricity savings of 4.5 % for the 
average household in this pilot group (Schleich et al., 2013).
To deal with budget constraints, the upfront costs of these measures 
need to be spread over time so the measures are viewed as economi-
cally viable and attractive. The Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) 
programme in the United States is designed to address the budget con-
straint problem. Participants in this programme receive financing for 
improvements that is repaid through an assessment on their property 
taxes for up to 20 years. Financing spreads the cost of energy improve-
ments over the expected life of measures such as weather sealing, 
energy efficient boilers and cooling systems, and solar installations 
and allows for the repayment obligation to transfer automatically to 
the next property owner if the property is sold. The program addresses 
two important barriers to increased adoption of energy efficiency and 
small-scale renewable energy: high upfront costs and fear that project 
costs will not be recovered prior to a future sale of the property (Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2011).
Social norms that encourage greater use of energy efficient technology 
at the household level can also encourage manufacturers to invest in 
the R&D for developing new energy efficient technologies and public 
sector actions such as well-enforced standards of energy efficiency as 
part of building sale requirements, (Dietz et al., 2013).
2�6�5�4 Adaptation and vulnerability reduction
Compared to mitigation measures, investments in adaptation appear 
to be more sensitive to uncertainties in the local impacts associated 
with the damage costs of climate change. This is not surprising for 
two reasons. First, while both mitigation and adaptation may result in 
lower local damage costs associated with climate impacts, the benefits 
of adaptation flow directly and locally from the actions taken (Prato, 
2008). Mitigation measures in one region or country, by contrast, 
deliver benefits that are global; however, they are contingent on the 
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actions of people in other places and in the future, rendering their local 
benefits more uncertain. One cannot simply equate marginal local 
damage costs with marginal mitigation costs, and hence the impor-
tance of uncertainty with respect to the local damage costs is dimin-
ished (Webster et al., 2003).
Second, politically negotiated mitigation targets, such as the 2 °C 
threshold appear to have been determined by what is feasible and 
affordable in terms of the pace of technological diffusion, rather than 
by an optimization of mitigation costs and benefits (Hasselmann 
et al., 2003; Baker et al., 2008; Hasselmann and Barker, 2008). Hence, 
mitigation actions taken to achieve a temperature target would not 
be changed if the damage costs (local or global) were found to be 
somewhat higher or lower. This implies that mitigation measures will 
be insensitive to uncertainty of these costs associated with climate 
change. Adaptation decisions, in contrast, face fewer political and 
technical constraints, and hence can more closely track what is needed 
in order to minimize local expected costs and hence will be more sensi-
tive to the uncertainties surrounding future damage costs from climate 
change (Patt et al., 2007, 2009).
There are two situations where decisions on adaptation policies and 
actions may be largely insensitive to uncertainties about the poten-
tial impacts of climate change on future damage. The first is where 
adaptation is constrained by the availability of finance, such as inter-
national development assistance. Studies by the World Bank, OECD, 
and other international organizations have estimated the financing 
needs for adaptation in developing countries to be far larger than 
funds currently available (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; World 
Bank, 2010; Patt et  al., 2010). In this case, adaptation actions are 
determined by decisions with respect to the allocation of available 
funds in competing regions rather than the local impacts of climate 
change on future damage (Klein et  al., 2007; Hulme et  al., 2011). 
Funding decisions and political constraints at the national level can 
also constrain adaptation so that choices no longer are sensitive to 
uncertainties with respect to local impacts (Dessai and Hulme, 2004, 
2007).
The other situation is where adaptation is severely constrained by cul-
tural norms and / or a lack of local knowledge and analytic skill as to 
what actions can be taken (Brooks et al., 2005; Füssel and Klein, 2006; 
O’Brien, 2009; Jones and Boyd, 2011). In this case, adaptive capacity 
could be improved through investments in education, development of 
local financial institutions and property rights systems, women’s rights, 
and other broad-based forms of poverty alleviation. There is a grow-
ing literature to suggest that such policies bring substantial benefits in 
the face of climate change that are relatively insensitive to the precise 
nature and extent of local climate impacts (Folke et al., 2002; World 
Bank, 2010; Polasky et al., 2011). These policies are designed to reduce 
these countries’ vulnerability to a wide range of potential risks rather 
than focusing on the impacts of climate change (Thornton et al., 2008; 
Eakin and Patt, 2011).
2�6�6 Public support and opposition to climate 
policy
In this section, we review what is known about public support or 
opposition to climate policy, climate-related infrastructure, and cli-
mate science. In all three cases, a critical issue is the role that percep-
tions of risks and uncertainties play in shaping support or opposition. 
Hence, the material presented here complements the discussion of 
perceptions of climate change risks and uncertainties (see Section 
2.4.6). Policy discussions on particular technologies often revolve 
around the health and safety risks associated with technology 
options, transition pathways, and systems such as nuclear energy 
(Pidgeon et al., 2008; Whitfield et al., 2009), coal combustion (Car-
michael et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2009), and underground carbon stor-
age (Itaoka et al., 2009; Shackley et al., 2009). There are also risks to 
national energy security that have given rise to political discussions 
advocating the substitution of domestically produced renewable 
energy for imported fossil fuels (Eaves and Eaves, 2007; Lilliestam 
and Ellenbeck, 2011).
2�6�6�1 Popular support for climate policy
There is substantial empirical evidence that people’s support or oppo-
sition to proposed climate policy measures is determined primarily by 
emotional factors and their past experience rather than explicit cal-
culations as to whether the personal benefits outweigh the personal 
costs. A national survey in the United States found that people’s sup-
port for climate policy also depended on cultural factors, with region-
ally differentiated worldviews playing an important role (Leiserowitz, 
2006), as did a cross-national comparison of Britain and the United 
States (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006), and studies comparing develop-
ing with developed countries (Vignola et al., 2012).
One of the major determinants of popular support for climate policy 
is whether people have an underlying belief that climate change is 
dangerous. This concern can be influenced by both cultural factors and 
the methods of communication (Smith, 2005; Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 
2011). Leiserowitz (2005) found a great deal of heterogeneity linked 
to cultural effects with respect to the perception of climate change 
in the United States. The use of language used to describe climate 
change — such as the distinction between ‘climate change’ and ‘global 
warming’ — play a role in influencing perceptions of risk, as well as 
considerations of immediate and local impacts (Lorenzoni et al., 2006). 
The portrayal of uncertainties and disagreements with respect to cli-
mate impacts was found to have a weak effect on whether people per-
ceived the impacts as serious, but a strong effect on whether they felt 
that the impacts deserved policy intervention (Patt, 2007). Studies in 
China (Wang et al., 2012) and Austria (Damm et al., 2013) found that 
people’s acceptance of climate-related policies was related to their 
underlying perceptions of risk but also to their beliefs about govern-
ment responsibility.
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An important question related to climate change communication is 
whether the popular reporting of climate change through disaster sce-
narios has the effect of energizing people to support aggressive policy 
intervention, or to become dismissive of the problem. A study examin-
ing responses to fictionalized disaster scenarios found them to have 
differential effects on perceptions and support for policy. They reduced 
people’s expectation of the local impacts, while increasing their sup-
port for global intervention (Lowe et  al., 2006). Other studies found 
interactive effects: those with a low awareness of climate change 
became concerned about being exposed to disaster scenarios, while 
those with a high awareness of climate change were dismissive of the 
possible impacts (Schiermeier, 2004).
Finally, the extent to which people believe it is possible to actually 
influence the future appears to be a major determinant of their support 
for both individual and collective actions to respond to climate change. 
In the case of local climate adaptation, psychological variables associ-
ated with self-empowerment were found to have played a much larger 
role in influencing individual behaviour than variables associated with 
economic and financial ability (Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Grothmann 
and Reusswig, 2006). With respect to mitigation policy, perceptions 
concerning the barriers to effective mitigation and beliefs that it was 
possible to respond to climate change were found to be important 
determinants of popular support (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).
2�6�6�2 Local support and opposition to infrastructure 
projects
The issue of local support or opposition to infrastructure projects in 
implementing climate policy is related to the role that perceived tech-
nological risks play in the process. This has been especially important 
with respect to nuclear energy, but is of increasing concern for carbon 
storage and renewable energy projects, and has become a major issue 
when considering expansion of low carbon energy technologies (Ellis 
et al., 2007; Van Alphen et al., 2007; Zoellner et al., 2008).
In the case of renewable energy technologies, a number of factors 
appear to influence the level of public support or opposition, factors 
that align well with a behavioural model in which emotional responses 
are highly contextual. One such factor is the relationship between proj-
ect developers and local residents. Musall and Kuik (2011) compared 
two wind projects, where residents feared negative visual impacts. They 
found that their fear diminished, and public support for the projects 
increased when there was co-ownership of the development by the local 
community. A second factor is the degree of transparency surrounding 
project development. Dowd et  al. (2011) investigated perceived risks 
associated with geothermal projects in Australia. Using a survey instru-
ment, they found that early, transparent communication of geothermal 
technology and risks tended to increase levels of public support.
A third such factor is the perception of economic costs and benefits 
that go hand-in-hand with the perceived environmental risks. Zoellner 
et al. (2008) examined public acceptance of three renewable technolo-
gies (grid-connected PV, biomass, and wind) and found that perceived 
economic risks associated with higher energy prices were the largest 
predictor of acceptance. Concerns over local environmental impacts, 
including visual impacts, were of concern where the perceived eco-
nomic risks were high. Breukers and Wolsink (2007) also found that 
that the visual impact of wind turbines was the dominant factor in 
explaining opposition against wind farms. Their study suggests that 
public animosity towards a wind farm is partly reinforced by the plan-
ning procedure itself, such as when stakeholders perceive that norms 
of procedural justice are not being followed.
Many studies have assessed the risks and examined local support for 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). According to Ha-Duong 
et al. (1997), the health and safety risks associated with carbon dioxide 
capture and transportation technologies differ across causal pathways 
but are similar in magnitude to technologies currently supported by 
the fossil-fuel industry. Using natural analogues, Roberts et al. (2011) 
concluded that the health risks of natural CO2 seepage in Italy was 
significantly lower than many socially accepted risks. For example, it 
were three orders of magnitude lower than the probability of being 
struck by lightning. 
Despite these risk assessments, there is mixed evidence of public 
acceptance of CO2 storage. For example, a storage research project was 
authorized in Lacq, France, but another was halted in Barendreich, The 
Netherlands due to public opposition. On the other hand, Van Alphen 
et al. (2007) evaluated the concerns with CCS among important stake-
holders, including government, industry, and NGO representatives and 
found support if the facility could be shown to have a low probability 
of leakage and was viewed as a temporary measure.
Wallquist et  al. (2012) used conjoint analysis to interpret a Swiss 
survey on the acceptability of CCS and found that concerns over 
local risks and impacts dominated the fears of the long-term climate 
impacts of leakage. The local concerns were less severe, and the public 
acceptance higher, for CCS projects combined with biomass combus-
tion, suggesting that positive feelings about removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere, rather than simply preventing its emission into the atmo-
sphere, influences perceptions of local risks. Terwel et al. (2011) found 
that support for CCS varied as a function of the stakeholders promot-
ing and opposing it, in a manner similar to the debate on renewable 
energy. Hence, there was greater support of CCS when its promoters 
were perceived to be acting in the public interest rather than purely for 
profit. Those opposing CCS were less likely to succeed when they were 
perceived to be acting to protect their own economic interests, such as 
property values, rather than focusing on environmental quality and the 
public good.
In the period between the publication of AR4 and the accident at 
the Fukushima power plant in Japan in March 2011, the riskiness of 
nuclear power as a climate mitigation option has received increasing 
attention. Socolow and Glaser (2009) highlight the urgency of taking 
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steps to reduce these risks, primarily by ensuring that nuclear fuels 
and waste materials are not used for weapons production. A number 
of papers examine the public’s perceived risks of nuclear power. In the 
United States, Whitfield et al. (2009) found risk perceptions to be fairly 
stable over time, with those people expressing confidence in ‘tradi-
tional values’ perceiving nuclear power to be less risky than others. 
In the United Kingdom, Pidgeon et al. (2008) found a willingness to 
accept the risks of nuclear power when it was framed as a means of 
reducing the risks of climate change, but that this willingness largely 
dissipated when nuclear power was suggested as an alternative to 
renewable energy for accomplishing this same objective.
2.7 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
The interface between science and policy is affected by epistemic 
uncertainty or uncertainty due to lack of information or knowledge for 
characterizing phenomena. Below we characterize suggested areas for 
future research that may enable us to reduce epistemic uncertainty.
Perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty:
•	 Examine cross-cultural differences in human perception and reac-
tion to climate change and response options.
•	 Understand the rebound effect induced by adopting mitiga-
tion measures for reducing the impact of climate change (e. g., 
increased driving when switching to a more fuel efficient car).
•	 Consider the design of long-term mitigation and adaptation strat-
egies coupled with short-term economic incentives to overcome 
myopic behaviour (e. g., loans for investing in energy efficient tech-
nologies so yearly payments are lower than the reduction in the 
annual energy bill).
•	 Encourage deliberative thinking in the design of policies to over-
come biases such as a preference for the current state of affairs or 
business-as-usual.
•	 Understand judgment and choice processes of key decision makers 
in firms and policymakers, especially in a climate change response 
context.
•	 Use descriptive models and empirical studies to design strategies 
for climate change negotiations and implementation of treaties.
Tools and decision aids for improving choices related to climate 
change:
•	 Characterize the likelihood of extreme events and examine their 
impact on the design of climate change policies.
•	 Study how robust decision making can be used in designing cli-
mate policy options when there is uncertainty with respect to the 
likelihood of climate change and its impacts.
•	 Examine how integrated assessment models can quantify the 
value of new climate observing systems.
•	 Empirically study how decision makers could employ intuitive 
and deliberative thinking to improve decisions and climate policy 
choices.
•	 Study the effectiveness of experiential methods like simulations, 
games, and movies in improving public understanding and percep-
tion of climate change processes.
•	 Consider the role of structured expert judgment in characterizing 
the nature of uncertainties associated with climate change and the 
design of mitigation and adaptation policies for addressing this risk.
Managing uncertainty risk and learning:
•	 Exploit the effectiveness of social norms in promoting mitigation 
and adaptation. 
•	 Quantify the environmental and societal risks associated with new 
technologies.
•	 Consider the special challenges faced by developing countries in 
dealing with risk and uncertainty with respect to climate change 
policies.
•	 Measure investor rankings of different risks associated with new 
technologies.
•	 Examine impact of government policy on mitigation decisions by 
firms and households.
•	 Determine what risks and uncertainties matter the most in devel-
oping policy instruments for dealing with climate change. 
•	 Examine the risks to energy systems, energy markets, and the secu-
rity of energy supply stemming from mitigation policies.
•	 Integrate analysis of the effects of interrelated policy decisions, 
such as how much to mitigate, what policy instruments to use for 
promoting climate change mitigation, and adaptation investment 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
2.8 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 2�1 When is uncertainty a reason to wait 
and learn rather than acting now in 
 relation to climate policy and risk 
management strategies? [Section 2�6�3]
Faced with uncertainty, policymakers may have a reason to wait and 
learn before taking a particular action rather than taking the action 
now. Waiting and learning is desirable when external events are likely 
to generate new information of sufficient importance as to suggest 
that the planned action would be unwise. Uncertainty may not be a 
reason to delay when the action itself generates new information and 
knowledge. 
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Uncertainty may also be a reason to avoid actions that are irreversible 
and / or have lock-in effects, such as making long-term investments in 
fossil-fuel based energy systems when climate outcomes are uncertain. 
This behaviour would reflect the precautionary principle for not under-
taking some measures or activities.
While the above criteria are fairly easy to understand, their applica-
tion can be complicated because a number of uncertainties relevant 
to a given decision may reinforce each other or may partially cancel 
each other out (e. g., optimistic estimates of technological change may 
offset pessimistic estimates of climate damages). Different interested 
parties may reach different conclusions as to whether external infor-
mation is likely or not to be of sufficient importance as to render the 
original action / inaction regrettable.
A large number of studies examine the act-now-or-wait-and-see ques-
tion in the context of climate change mitigation. So far, most of these 
analyses have used integrated assessment models (IAMs). At the 
national level, these studies examine policy strategies and instruments 
to achieve mitigation targets; at the firm or individual level the studies 
examine whether one should invest in a particular technology.
A truly integrated analysis of the effects of multiple types of uncer-
tainty on interrelated policy decisions, such as how much to mitigate, 
with what policy instruments, promoting what investments, has yet to 
be conducted. The probabilistic information needed to support such an 
analysis is currently not available.
FAQ 2�2 How can behavioural responses and 
tools for improving decision making 
impact on  climate change policy? 
[ Section 2�4]
The choice of climate change policies can benefit from examining the 
perceptions and responses of relevant stakeholders. Empirical evidence 
indicates decision makers such as firms and households tend to place 
undue weight on short-run outcomes. Thus, high upfront costs make 
them reluctant to invest in mitigation or adaptation measures. Consis-
tent with the theory of loss aversion, investment costs and their associ-
ated risks have been shown to be of greater importance in decisions 
to fund projects that mitigate climate change than focusing on the 
expected returns associated with the investment. 
Policy instruments (e. g., long-term loans) that acknowledge these 
behavioural biases and spread upfront costs over time so that they 
yield net benefits in the short-run have been shown to perform quite 
well. In this context, policies that make investments relatively risk free, 
such as feed-in tariffs, are more likely to stimulate new technology 
than those that focus on increasing the expected price such as cap-
and-trade systems.
Human responses to climate change risks and uncertainties can also 
indicate a failure to put adequate weight on worst-case scenarios. 
Consideration of the full range of behavioural responses to informa-
tion will enable policymakers to more effectively communicate cli-
mate change risks to stakeholders and to design decision aids and 
climate change policies that are more likely to be accepted and imple-
mented.
FAQ 2�3 How does the presence of uncertainty 
affect the choice of policy instruments? 
[Section 2�6�5]
Many climate policy instruments are designed to provide decision 
makers at different levels (e. g., households, firms, industry asso-
ciations, guilds) with positive incentives (e. g., subsidies) or penalties 
(e. g., fines) to incentivize them to take mitigation actions. The impact 
of these incentives on the behaviour of the relevant decision makers 
depends on the form and timing of these policy instruments.
Instruments such as carbon taxes that are designed to increase the 
cost of burning fossil fuels rely on decision makers to develop expec-
tations about future trajectories of fuel prices and other economic 
conditions. As uncertainty in these conditions increases, the respon-
siveness of economic agents decreases. On the other hand, invest-
ment subsidies and technology standards provide immediate incen-
tives to change behaviour, and are less sensitive to long-term market 
uncertainty. Feed-in tariffs allow investors to lock in a given return on 
investment, and so may be effective even when market uncertainty is 
high.
FAQ 2�4 What are the uncertainties and risks 
that are of particular importance to 
climate policy in developing countries? 
[Box 2�1]
Developing countries are often more sensitive to climate risks, such as 
drought or coastal flooding, because of their greater economic reliance 
on climate-sensitive primary activities, and because of inadequate 
infrastructure, finance, and other enablers of successful adaptation and 
mitigation. Since AR4, research on relevant risks and uncertainties in 
developing countries has progressed substantially, offering results in 
two main areas.
Studies have demonstrated how uncertainties often place low carbon 
energy sources at an economic disadvantage, especially in developing 
countries. The performance and reliability of new technologies may 
be less certain in developing countries than in industrialized coun-
tries because they could be unsuited to the local context and needs. 
Other reasons for uncertain performance and reliability could be due 
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to poor manufacturing, a lack of adequate testing in hot or dusty envi-
ronments, or limited local capacity to maintain and repair equipment. 
Moreover, a number of factors associated with economic, political, 
and regulatory uncertainty result in much higher real interest rates in 
developing countries than in the developed world. This creates a disin-
centive to invest in technologies with high upfront but lower operating 
costs, such as renewable energy, compared to fossil-fuel based energy 
infrastructure.
Given the economic disadvantage of low carbon energy sources, 
important risk tradeoffs often need to be considered. On the one hand, 
low-carbon technologies can reduce risks to health, safety, and the 
environment, such as when people replace the burning of biomass for 
cooking with modern and efficient cooking stoves. But on the other 
hand, low-carbon modern energy is often more expensive than its 
higher-carbon alternatives. There are however, some opportunities for 
win-win outcomes on economic and risk grounds, such as in the case 
of off-grid solar power.
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